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REVOLUTION AND REACTION IN EUROPE AND THEIR
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by

Michael Gordon Waldhauser

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Thesis Advisor:

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Revolution and Reaction in Europe and Their Effects on the
International System

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines two periods of major revolutionary change in Europe - France in 1789 and Central Europe in 1848 - to determine what forces emerged from the associated events to undermine the stability of the existing international system. Although both revolutionary periods were different, each produced the following destabilizing forces: heightened nationalism; a decline in the internationalist perspective among the ruling elites; instability among the ruling elites; conflict in the center of Europe; heightened awareness and importance of ideological differences; a breakdown in the cohesiveness of the international system; and finally diplomacy that was characterized by the pursuit of policies that had vastly greater ends pursued with greatly expanded means. Similar forces appear to be emerging in the aftermath of the upheavals of 1989, and therefore the friction in the international system will increase similarly to the past. In effect, the tentative uniformities among destabilizing forces after 1789 and 1848 will come into operation after 1989.

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I. INTRODUCTION

To quote Michael Howard, "In 1989, while the nations of Western Europe celebrated the bicentenary of the French Revolution, the nations of Eastern Europe reenacted it."¹ The reference to these two events as analogous are a cause of great concern, however, as the enthusiasm and joy experienced by the French in 1789 was shortlived as the wars that followed devastated the European continent. As troubling as the outbreak of a series of analogous wars in Eastern Europe may seem, there are other analogies that are just as worrisome to both the newly formed democracies of Eastern Europe and the Western democratic nations.

In 1848 conservative monarchies throughout Europe were overthrown as revolutionary upheaval in France quickly spread across Europe to Budapest, Vienna, Berlin, Milan and Prague. These dynastic collapses created a huge power vacuum throughout Europe, and left the new inexperienced liberal leaders with the task of transforming abstract political ideals into reality. The inability of the new leaders to accomplish this task resulted in the resurgence of conservative reactionaries, and led one leading English historian to note that the revolution "...exhausted itself without achieving concrete results: it left its imprint only in the realm of ideas."²

Although argument by analogy is dangerous and can often be misleading, the events of 1789 and 1848 illustrate the perils that revolutionary change poses to the international system. The French Revolution destroyed the relative peace and tranquility of the eighteenth century European order and plunged the continent into an unprecedented period of warfare. Similarly, the revolutions of 1848 undermined the stability on the European continent established by the Congress of Vienna and ushered in a new and more dangerous period as the European states became increasingly nationalistically oriented. But what factors and forces emerged from these revolutions that created instability in the international system? Perhaps more importantly, are these factors and forces present following the revolutions of 1989, and what does this indicate about the stability of the evolving international system?

This thesis has two purposes. First, to determine the factors and forces that emerged from the post revolutionary periods of 1789 and 1848 that tended to create instability in the international system. Second, to determine if these same factors and forces are present following the revolutions of 1989, and to assess their likely impact on the stability of the international system.

¹Michael Howard, "The Springtime of Nations," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69 No. 1 (1990), 17.

²Lewis Namier, 1848 The Revolution of the Intellectuals, (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), 31.

II. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The events that took place in Europe during the eighteenth century have had a lasting impact on the evolution of the international system. Although at the beginning of the century the framework of European diplomacy was well established, by the eve of the French Revolution this framework had been vastly expanded to the east with the emergence of the great powers of Prussia and Russia. The emergence of Prussia and Russia resulted in the establishment of a true multipolar balance of power system which covered the entire continent, and because of the competition between the European powers for colonies overseas, the system could in a limited sense be described as global. The emergence of this multipolar balance of power system substantially diluted the bipolar ideological struggle that had developed between the French continental world and the British island world during the seventeenth century,¹ and resulted in the emergence of a number of critical factors that helped to promote international stability in the eighteenth century. The events that led to the development of this stable system will now be examined with the ultimate purpose to help understand if the events of the early 1990s are tending toward stability or instability in Europe.

A. THE EMERGENCE OF THE BALANCE OF POWER

The Treaties of Utrecht (April 1713), Rastatt (March 1714) and Baden (September 1714) brought an end to the War of the Spanish Succession that had lasted from 1701 to 1714 and attempted to establish a balance of power and an equilibrium of forces in Western Europe. These treaties ended the fighting and no major war developed until 1740 when conflict erupted over the Austrian succession. This relatively quiet period was more the result of the events following the negotiations of the treaties and the general level of exhaustion experienced by the major powers from the war, however, than the result of any diplomatic brilliance in the treaties. Despite this fact, this series of treaties played an important role in both the conduct of international relations and in the formation of the international system during the first half of the eighteenth century.

The peace treaties of 1713-14 reestablished the legitimacy of the independent dynastic state recognized by the Treaty of Westphalia. The dreams of France's Louis XIV to be chosen Holy Roman Emperor, unite the Kingdoms of Spain and France, and establish an era of French preponderance on the continent had been shattered. The peace treaties successfully divided the territories of the Spanish Habsburgs and put an end to any serious effort to unify all of Europe under a single authority. Thus, despite the fact

that the treaties were largely overcome by events, these peace treaties played an important role in the development of the international system because they reinforced both the legitimacy of the dynastic rulers established by the Treaty of Westphalia and the legitimacy of the concept of independent dynastic states. The legitimacy of these concepts would eventually lead to the development of a multipolar system in Europe, although in the immediate aftermath of the war the primary concern was to restrain future universal pretensions of France.

Following the Treaty of Utrecht it appeared that efforts to restrain France would result in the European powers reforming alliances along traditional bipolar lines with England, Austria and the Dutch opposing France, which was sometimes supported by Spain and some of the German states. This tendency was reinforced when soon after the conclusion of the treaty, Louis XIV seemed determined to evade the terms which stipulated the demolition of Dunkirk as a naval base. The fear of renewed French aggression allowed England, Austria and the Netherlands to set aside differences that had emerged between them during the war and unite to restrain France.

To restrict France the allies established a series of barriers along the frontiers of France by setting up neutral buffer states in Germany, Italy and the Low Countries. The Barrier Treaty was concluded in November 1715, and although

these small neutral states were not strong enough to act independently, with allied support, particularly from England, these small states could be used to check any renewed French aggression. Additionally, England also envisioned using these states as a counterbalance to any expansionist desires of the Austrian emperor.

Although it appeared that with the reformation of European alliances along traditional lines that stability would be brought to Europe, even before the completion of the Barrier Treaty uncertainty began to arise about the succession of the rulers in England and France. Since disputes over the legitimacy of any major ruler had proved to be destabilizing to the European balance of power, the precarious positions of both the rulers of England and France would have to be solidified before stability could be achieved.

Internal instability was particularly troublesome in France following the death of Louis XIV in September 1715, which left Louis XV, a sick and fragile boy of five, the ascendant to the throne. Had Louis XV died, the only remaining legitimate male descendants of Louis XIV would have been the Spanish Bourbons, but they were barred from the French throne by the Treaty of Utrecht,² which established the Duke of Orleans as the legal heir to Louis XV. Since the Duke of Orleans and the Spanish Bourbon King Philip V were bitter personal enemies, the death of Louis XV

would have most likely resulted in a war over the French succession.

The Duke of Orleans, who held the title of regent, had consolidated his position in France, although his strength was constantly challenged by many factions of the "old guard" of the French court who favored Philip V and desired a closer friendship between France and Spain. To counter the possibility of Spanish support for the old guard resulting in a war of succession, the regent hoped to entice another power to give him friendly support. The unlikely recipient of French diplomatic efforts was England, where peculiar domestic conditions led France to believe that England would be willing to form an alliance.³

In England, King George I, who had previously held the position of the Elector of Hanover prior to succeeding Queen Anne on 1 August 1714, faced an internal challenge from the Jacobite rising of 1715. The rising attempted to restore the catholic Stuart, James III, to the English throne. The rising collapsed in early 1716, mainly because James III was a true catholic and refused to change his religion to claim the throne. Despite this failure, James III remained a serious threat to George I, and the possibility remained that James III might one day change his faith and thereby increase his prospects for claiming the throne. As a result of this constant menace, George I was continuously surrounded by an insecure domestic situation.⁴

Although it is doubtful that George's internal situation would have resulted in England entering into an alliance with France, when combined with the events which were taking place in Northern Europe as the second Northern War raged on in the fall of 1716, the English became more inclined to reach an agreement with France. Peter the Great of Russia had quartered his troops in Mecklenburg and George I perceived this as a threat to the interests of Hannover.⁵ George I wanted to remove this threat as well as gain Swedish territory on the southern coast of the Baltic, and as a result George I was ready to reach an agreement with France because of France's strong traditional influence in Sweden. The alliance between England and France was signed in October of 1716, and was later expanded to include the Dutch on 4 January 1717.⁶

The Anglo-French alliance proved to be a stabilizing factor in early eighteenth century Europe. The two powers were able to bring an end to Spain's expansionist desires in Italy during the war of 1719, and French diplomacy was instrumental in ending the Northern War with the Treaty of Nystadt in September 1721. Although Russia emerged as the true victor from the Northern War, and Russia's emergence as a great power is most often attributed to the successes of Peter the Great, Russia's influence in international affairs was limited during the next two decades by the series of short reigns (four successions in sixteen years) of its

rulers. The absence of Russian influence during this period allowed the Anglo-French alliance to preserve the peace relatively effectively until the mid 1730s, when a combination of events significantly altered the continental situation and resulted in the true emergence of Russia and Prussia as great powers. The result of these events would be to establish a true multipolar system which covered the entire European continent.

B. THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION

Beginning in the early 1730s frictions developed among the colonial powers of England, Spain and France regarding trade. These frictions were the result of an inept Spanish imperial policy which allowed Spanish colonies to trade only with Spain. Because Spain and France had already established strong trading ties between them, this policy greatly benefited France as Spain was often times just an intermediate stop for French goods on their way to the colonies. As a result, prior to the outbreak of the war between England and Spain in October 1739, English trade had remained almost stationary while French trade rapidly increased, particularly in the Spanish markets. The large demand for goods of the Spanish colonies, however, was much greater than Spain, despite being aided by France, could supply. These shortages were made up through illicit trade, particularly with the English who had become more

industrialized and were eager to exploit new markets.⁷

Although the Spanish government was moderately tolerant of English illicit trade, the Spanish colonial governors and merchants became particularly alarmed as their monopoly trade rights were circumvented. As a result the Spanish governors were able to induce their colonists to fit out coastguard ships in an attempt to stop the illicit trade. Although these coastguard ships were not very effective, in 1737 they successfully seized about a dozen English ships.⁸

The tensions caused by the seizure of the ships in the West Indies were intensified by the charges of barbarous conduct on the part of both the Spanish colonial coastguards personnel and the English smugglers. The Spanish government sought to avoid conflict with England, however, and adopted a conciliatory attitude when England brought its complaints to the Spanish government over the seizure of its ships. According to the Spanish government, "...even if some suspicion of illicit trade remains, the prevention of illicit trade should never make Spanish officials lose sight of the need of good harmony with the other powers of Europe."⁹

The Spanish attempt to smooth over the situation, however, was not successful. British public opinion had become increasingly anti-Spanish, and visions of conquest of wealthy Spanish colonies resulted in many Englishmen

becoming anxious for war with Spain. Disputes over the boundaries of British Georgia and Spanish Florida only served to exacerbate the situation. Finally, the weakness and division within the British cabinet made it almost impossible for the government to combat popular sentiment, and as a result Spain and England were at war in October 1739.

The conflict that developed between England and Spain undermined the Anglo-French alliance that had maintained the balance in Europe. Although the French had few smugglers involved in the West Indies, over one-half of all the commodities carried by the Spanish galleons to the Spanish colonies came from France. France therefore had a powerful motive to support Spain to ensure the future strength of its export commodities. In August 1740 France sent two battle squadrons to the West Indies to support the Spanish. Before the French could join the war against England, however, the death of the Emperor Charles VI and the instabilities that emerged in Austria and Central Europe forced France to recall its squadrons in order to deal with these continental complications.¹⁰

The war that developed over the Austrian succession was in some ways surprising. Although Sardinia and Spain desired the opportunity to obtain additional possessions in northern Italy at Austria's expense, the positions that the great powers found themselves in had a moderating influence

on the continental situation. England and Spain were at war, and the French were on the verge of joining the clash against England, and therefore none of these parties desired any continental complications. Although Bavaria refused to recognize Maria Theresa as the Austrian heir, Bavaria did not pose a threat due to its general lack of resources.¹¹ Finally, Russia was faced with internal difficulties, and with tensions rising with Sweden, Russia did not overly concern itself with affairs in Central Europe.¹²

The surprising assault upon Austria came from Prussia. The young Frederick II clearly realized the geopolitical importance of the Habsburg province of Silesia for Prussian power. The annexation of Silesia would not only provide an immensely wealthy province, but also weaken the Elector of Saxony by placing Prussian territory between his German lands and Polish kingdom. Furthermore, Frederick's masterful assessment¹³ of the strategic situation that had developed in central Europe provided the perfect framework for Prussia to aggrandize itself at Austria's expense. In December 1740, Prussia invaded Silesia, starting a conflict that would soon expand to cover the entire continent.

French policy in the spring of 1741 was the key to events on the continent. Although Cardinal Fleury desired to maintain French neutrality in order to be able to concentrate French efforts on the struggle with England, he was unable to restrain the nobility that possessed a long

anti-Habsburg tradition. The traditional anti-Habsburg sentiments were intensified in March 1741 when the French envoy Marshal de Belleises, who was related by marriage to Charles Albert of Bavaria, traveled to the German states to obtain support for Charles Albert's candidacy for the vacant imperial title. Belleisle converted this mission into one of constructing an anti-Habsburg coalition in Germany designed to dismember the Habsburg states, a policy strongly supported by the French nobility.

French ambitions against Austria alarmed England's George II about the safety of his German Electorate of Hanover. In July George II came to an understanding with his enemies, and without consulting his ministers in London, signed an agreement guaranteeing Hanover's neutrality. With England's neutrality secured, French and Bavarian troops invaded Bohemia in October. The neutrality of Hanover was very unpopular in England, which was seen as allowing England's traditional enemy France to make another attempt at continental hegemony. This contributed to the fall of the ministry of Walpole, and resulted in England's foreign policy being taken over by Lord Carteret, the new secretary of the Northern Department.

Carteret successfully pressured Maria Theresa to sign the Preliminaries of Breslau in June 1742 to make peace with Prussia in order to be able to concentrate English and Austrian efforts against France. This agreement ended the

Austro-Prussian war and conceded Silesia to Frederick. In return for Austria's peace settlement with Prussia, the English offered Maria Theresa additional subsidies and troops to counter the French threat. Although Austria resented English demands regarding the concession of Silesia to Prussia, it was the events that took place in Italy that laid the foundations for the diplomatic revolution that would occur following the end of the war.

The struggle that developed in Italy was largely between the Austrians and the Spanish. Spain hoped to gain the Austrian domain of Milanese and Tuscany, however, any struggle between these two in Italy could be substantially influenced by Charles Emmanuel, king of Sardinia-Piedmont. Sardinia, which controlled the Alpine passes, could take advantage of these mountains to oppose any invasion of Italy.¹⁴ As a result, both Spain and Austria attempted to win Charles Emmanuel's support by promising territorial concessions. Charles Emmanuel realized, however, that Spanish concessions were contingent upon Spanish success, while Austria already possessed territories that could be exchanged for Sardinian support. Maria Theresa realized this as well, and was therefore only willing to offer minimal concessions to ensure his support. Maria Theresa's position was undermined, however, by Carteret, who insisted that substantial territorial concessions be granted immediately in exchange for Sardinia's support. Once again

Carteret prevailed and coerced Maria Theresa to conclude the Treaty of Worms on 13 September 1743. The treaty surrendered a large portion of Lombardy and a section of Piacenza in exchange for a Sardinian army of 45,000 troops and vague English promises of territorial compensations once victory in Italy had been achieved.¹⁵ The concessions forced upon Austria were deeply resented, and only the threat to Austrian territory by the French prevented the Anglo-Austrian coalition from falling apart.

While the Treaty of Worms served to create a rift in the Anglo-Austrian alliance, it served to unite Austria's antagonists. The treaty provoked France to secure a Spanish alliance in October 1743 with the Treaty of Fontainebleau,¹⁶ and in March 1744 the French declared war on England and Hanover, followed in May by a declaration of war on Austria and the invasion of the Netherlands. Additionally, because the Treaty of Worms guaranteed the enforcement of the Pragmatic Sanction but made no mention of the surrender of Silesia to Prussia, Frederick signed a new treaty with France in June 1744, followed shortly thereafter by the Prussian invasion of Bohemia.¹⁷

The offensive against Austria failed however when cooperation between the French, Spanish and Prussians broke down over a series of disputes regarding the failure of the Franco-Spanish naval operations off of Toulon in February 1744. Similarly, the failure of the French army to engage

the retreating Austrian army in Alsace during the Austrian invasion of France in 1744 was also a source of conflict. The retreat of the Austrian army intact resulted in Frederick's army in Bohemia facing the main Austrian army, which forced Frederick's retreat back to Silesia by the end of 1744.¹⁸ Austrian attempts to regain Silesia were defeated by Frederick's masterful military victories at Hohenfriedberg and Soor, and the Prussian victory at Kesseldorf, placing Frederick in control of Saxony.¹⁹

The combination of Frederick's victory in Saxony, threats of withdrawal of British subsidies if the war with Prussia was not concluded, and the rejection of Austrian peace proposals to France resulted in the Treaty of Dresden which was signed in December 1745.²⁰ The Treaty of Dresden ended the second Austro-Prussian conflict and firmly established Prussia's control over Silesia. Although the war would continue for another three years with fighting in Italy and the Netherlands between England, Austria and the United Provinces against the French and Spanish, the conflict in Germany was over.

The fighting in Italy dissipated quickly as cooperation between France and Spain and between Austria and Sardinia deteriorated. In the Netherlands, French victories at Lauffeldt and the capture of the fortress Bergen-op-Zoom raised the chances for French success. However, the combination of French war weariness and the hiring of

Russian troops by Austria, which had now become possible due to the settlement of the Swedish-Russian conflict. resulted in the opening of the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle in early 1748.

With the exception of Prussia's annexation of Silesia, the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle concluded in October 1748 returned Europe to the status quo ante bellum. Any territorial gains achieved by one of the great powers was generally offset by reciprocal compensations elsewhere.

Although geographically Europe had only been marginally altered, the War of the Austrian Succession had a significant impact on the development of the international system and the balance of power on the European continent. Russia, which had defeated Sweden, conquered Finland, and maintained a protectorate over Poland; and Prussia, which had gained the geographically important and wealthy province of Silesia, had emerged as true great powers. Austria, though stung by its loss of Silesia to Prussia was still perhaps the strongest power in Central Europe. Spain's strength and prestige continued to decline, and England and France had "...gained nothing but the experience of each other's strength and power."²¹ The multipolar system represented by these five powers was thus well balanced as all the powers possessed relatively equal strength. Maintaining the balance of this international system dominated European diplomacy until the end of World War I.

C. THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION OF 1755

The antagonisms that developed between the alliances during the War of the Austrian Succession, coupled with the emergence of Prussian and Russia as great powers, and the continued antagonisms that existed between France and England and between Prussia and Austria resulted in a multipolar system that was in a state of flux. England sought to concentrate its efforts against the colonial challenge of France while remaining detached from continental entanglements, although the threat to Hanover from Prussia could not be overlooked. Austria desired to regain the territory it lost to Prussia, but realized that English support for Austria's ambitions was negligible. Prussia was fearful of attack from both Austria and Russia, and the French difficulties in countering the English naval threat made Frederick question the likelihood of French support against attempts to destroy Prussia.

The increased threat of war that developed between England and France in late 1754 provided the event that allowed a re-alignment of traditional European alliances. England's attempts to secure Austria's support for the defense of Hanover were not well received. Under the guidance of Chancellor Kaunitz, Austria stated that it would only provide protection of Hanover if England agreed to support an Austro-Russian offensive plan for the destruction of Prussia.²² Austria had no intention of subordinating

its goal of the destruction of Prussia to England's continental interests. The lack of Austrian support resulted in England signing the Convention of St. Petersburg with Russia in September 1755. In exchange for 500,000 pounds sterling annually, Russia would provide 55,000 troops quartered in Livonia to secure the safety of Hanover. Although England's foreign minister Newcastle felt that the agreement with Russia would prevent England from becoming involved in a continental conflict, the Convention of St. Petersburg upset the traditional continental system and set off a profound realignment.

Frederick II of Prussia, faced with the possibility of a concerted onslaught from England, Austria and Russia, sought to achieve the insulation of Germany from the growing Anglo-French conflict. In January 1756 Prussia and England concluded the Convention of Westminster in which both sides pledged not to "...attack, or invade, directly or indirectly, the territories of the other,..." and additionally, both sides affirmed to "...prevent their respective allies from undertaking against the said territories in any matter whatever."²³

The Anglo-Prussian alliance produced a severe diplomatic backlash in both France and Russia. France was outraged that Frederick had negotiated with his longtime enemy and did not even bother to consult France beforehand. Russia felt England had betrayed the Convention of St. Petersburg

which was directed against Prussia. The benefactor of this backlash was Austria.

On 1 May 1756 France and Austria signed the First Treaty of Versailles. The treaty bound both parties to provide 24,000 men in the event that either one of the parties should be attacked.²⁴ Although the small number of men and the defensive nature of the treaty make it relatively insignificant militarily, its most dramatic impact was the change that it represented in international relations. The Franco-Austro alliance reversed the historic antagonisms that had existed between Austria and France and demonstrates the subordination of ideological and dynastic differences to the maintenance of the international system and the balance of power.

The Franco-Austro alliance, coupled with the Anglo-Prussian alliance resulted in Russia seeking closer ties with Austria and France. Russia sought to conclude an alliance with Austria against Prussia, although it was not until after the start of the Seven Years War that Russia acceded to the First Treaty of Versailles at the end of 1756.

Although war between the imperial powers of France and England began in May 1756, the expansion of the war to the European continent was the result of the actions of Frederick II. Frederick, faced with the possibility of attack from Austria, Russia, Saxony, and France, decided

that fighting a preemptive war was Prussia's best chance for survival. On 29 August 1756 Frederick launched the invasion of Saxony. Thus, England's diplomatic attempts to pacify the continent had instead precipitated a diplomatic revolution which now resulted in the most desperate struggle on the continent in the eighteenth century.

D. THE SEVEN YEARS WAR

The Seven Years War was an epic struggle with wide fluctuations of fortune. Although Frederick gained an initial success over Saxony at Piena on 16 October 1756,²⁵ once Austria, Russia and France mobilized opposition, Prussia's existence was in jeopardy. Frederick suffered defeats at Kolin by the Austrian army on 18 June 1757, and only Austria's inability to pursue the routed Prussian army saved Frederick from complete destruction. The Russians defeated the Prussian army under Marshal Lehwaldt at Gross-Jaegersdorf on 30 August 1757, threatening Frederick with the loss of East Prussia. Additionally, the Swedes, who had joined the anti-Prussian coalition in March invaded Pomerania in September. A final devastating blow fell to Prussia when the Duke of Cumberland and his Hanoverian army signed the Convention of Kloster-Seven with the French on 8 September as Cumberland's army was trapped in between the North Sea and the Elbe river.

Faced with the destruction of Prussia, Frederick then

engineered two masterful victories that assured the future existence of Prussia and solidified his reputation as a military leader of exceptional abilities. At Rossbach in November, Frederick defeated the Franco-Imperial army despite being outnumbered by two to one. One month later Frederick crushed the Austrians in a brilliant triumph at Leuthen, thereby securing Prussia's hold on Silesia.

Although Frederick had now regained, and indeed strengthened Prussia's prestige, the losses suffered by the Prussian army during these campaigns seriously weakened the long term prospects for Prussia's survival. Fortunately, the coalition against Frederick suffered a series of internal crises that dissolved the alliance before Prussia collapsed.

In March 1760 France signed the Third Treaty of Versailles, cutting French subsidies to Austria and reducing military support to 100,000 troops for use in Germany.²⁶ This reduction was most likely the result of the combination of the low level of compensation offered by the Austrian's for the French services and the need for France to concentrate its efforts against England.

More importantly, on 5 January 1762 Elizabeth of Russia died. Elizabeth had been the driving force in the anti-Prussian coalition since 1759, and her replacement, Peter III, who was an ardent admirer of Frederick, ordered an immediate armistice. In May Russia and Prussia signed a

peace agreement, leaving Austria alone to attempt to defeat Prussia and recapture Silesia.

The collapse of the anti-Prussian alliance resulted in successful peace negotiations between Prussia and Austria. Additionally, the Anglo-French conflict was resolved in a separate treaty. The dual nature of the peace treaties was a direct reflection of the dual nature of the war - one which pitted the imperial power of England against France, and the other the struggle between Prussia and Austria over Silesia and the domination over Germany.

The Seven Years War ended with few changes to the territorial division of Europe, although it had important long term effects on the conduct of the great powers. Frederick's military capabilities had ensured Prussia's existence as a great power, but only at a tremendous cost. Prussia was now completely isolated in Europe - Austria and Saxony were bitter enemies and the French only slightly less so. Only an alliance with Russia was possible and this only extended as far as their mutual interests.

France, despite remaining the strongest power in terms of population and resources, had suffered a serious blow to its military reputation. England had secured naval supremacy over France, and Prussia's military prowess was now more highly regarded than that of France. Additionally, France's traditional hostility to Austria would eventually reemerge as the result of the failure of the Franco-Austro

alliance. France's defeat in the Seven Years War also produced a series of domestic controversies which weakened the French monarchy, thereby laying the groundwork for the events that would rock the continent in 1789.

Although England emerged as the potential greatest victor of the war. English diplomats failed to demand adequate compensation from the French during the peace negotiations, and in a large part they " ..undid the overwhelming victory of Great Britain by adroitly alternating resolution with timely concession."²⁷ The concessions granted by England ensured that France would eventually regain its greatness, and then undoubtedly seek revenge.

The defeat of France coupled with the traditional English desire to avoid continental entanglements resulted in the balance of power shifting to the east, where Prussia, Russia and Austria dominated the affairs of the continent, particularly in Poland and Turkey.

E. SUMMARY

After looking at the history of European relations in the eighteenth century, on the surface it would appear that a state of international anarchy existed. This perception is superficial, however, when the diplomatic situation is looked at from a broader perspective. Although the European continent was involved in three major wars, with the

exception of the Prussian conquest and annexation of Silesia, the geographic division of Europe on the eve of the French Revolution was very similar to that established by the Treaty of Utrecht in April of 1713. Indeed, when compared with previous epic struggles such as the wars of religion and the national wars that later developed in the nineteenth century, eighteenth century European relations were relatively mild and stable. But what factors contributed to the stability of the eighteenth century international system and prevented the numerous conflicts that developed in Europe from expanding into the large scale conflicts of annihilation like the wars of the religion or the clashes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries?

Although there are numerous and complex forces involved, there appears to be several key factors, either through their presence or absence, that produced the stability of the eighteenth century international system. The first significant factor was the relative stability of the ruling elites of the European dynastic states. This stability was the result of the peace treaties of Utrecht, Rastatt and Baden which re-established the legitimacy of the dynastic rulers. Despite the fact that disagreements existed over the rightful descendants to the throne in France, England and Austria, the fundamental principles underlying the dynastic order were never seriously challenged. Not only did this situation allow for a commonality of outlook

amongst the ruling elites, it also produced a highly structured domestic order that helped to prevent widespread domestic discontent. The combination of a common fundamental belief in the correctness and legitimacy of the dynastic principles, and the ordered structure of eighteenth century society contributed significantly to the stability of the international system.

The second factor was the absence of nationalism, particularly as it affected the armed forces and the conduct of international diplomacy. The lack of nationalism had a profound influence on the military forces of the period. The lack of a strong allegiance between subjects and kings severely restricted the ability of monarchs to raise tax revenues and personnel to support an army. As a result, armies tended to be comprised of an officer corps of nobility, who fought mainly for honor, glory or ambition, and common soldiers, who fought for a living and could therefore be considered almost as mercenaries. Additionally, the lack of strong nationalist feelings resulted in many armed forces being comprised of foreign soldiers. The combination of the low quality state recruits with little nationalist sentiments, and the use of foreign troops who could never be completely trusted, severely restricted the mobility of eighteenth century armed forces. Finally, because these "professional" armies tended to be expensive to maintain, the European monarchs tended to be

conservative in their use and employment, another moderating influence in eighteenth century relations.²⁸ The financial burden that large armies placed on the dynastic state was reflected in the series of treaties between allies during the eighteenth century, which often times called for the granting of subsidies as often as it called for troop assistance.

The lack of nationalist sentiment amongst the personnel of the armed forces also had significant implications for their employment on the battlefield. As Professor Dorn notes: "The greater numerical strength of armies, together with the means of recruiting them, had introduced into the ranks unreliable elements which could be kept with the colors only by the most rigorous discipline and supervision. To have permitted these armies to forage freely over the countryside would have encouraged wholesale desertion."²⁹ As a result, battles tended to be systematic in nature, with troops arranged in specified formations, and wars being essentially fought through maneuver and position. Additionally, since these armies were supplied through state magazines, even if a battle had been won it was difficult to pursue an army in retreat for fear of overextending supply lines and thereby forcing increased desertions.

The absence of nationalism also affected the composition of the diplomatic services of the period. Although eighteenth century diplomatic services were not as

internationalist as the armies of the period, many countries used foreign diplomats to fill such posts as resident, consul or secretary; and even higher positions if no appropriate native personnel were available. Further reinforcing the internationalist nature of diplomacy was the adoption of both the French diplomatic system and the French language as the standardized means of conducting international relations. As M. S. Anderson observed:

"Nearly all great treaties of the century after that of Utrecht were drawn up in French, though in each case with a saving clause providing that this was not to be taken as a precedent. Such was its prestige and attractive power that by the second half of this period it was being used on a considerable scale in many countries for correspondence between diplomats and their governments."²⁰ The homogeneous nature of the diplomatic services of the eighteenth century served to moderate conflicts and increase international stability.

A third factor contributing to international stability was the lack of widely divergent ideological views. Although it is true that sometimes substantial differences existed between the political, legal and commercial systems, as well as between cultural and philosophical traditions between the great powers, these differences were not so divergent so as to prevent cooperation when critical issues were at stake. The rapprochement between England and France

following the War of the Spanish Succession and the diplomatic revolution that preceded the Seven Years War illustrates the flexibility that existed during this period. The religious conflicts of the past were no longer as important, and Liberalism had yet to make a significant impact on society.

The lack of ideological division reinforced the internationalism of the period by contributing to the feeling that Europe was forming into a federation.³¹ Additionally, the relative ideological homogeneity of the period helped to ensure that the European powers did not intervene in the domestic affairs of the other powers, reinforcing the stability of the ruling elites. Although the great powers often sought territorial conquest and aggrandizement, this was not perceived to be the extension of a revolutionary domestic situation, but rather the result of a common outlook amongst the powers, making warfare "...a function if not an actual necessity, of the structure of European society."³²

The absence of modern nationalism and the lack of widely divergent ideological views contributed to a fourth factor, which was the general internationalist perspective of the ruling elites, and to a lesser extent, the peoples of eighteenth century Europe. The subjects of the ruling monarchs felt no particular allegiance to their king, allowing an extensive degree of flexibility amongst the

rulers. England accepted the Elector of Hanover as King, Bourbons sat on the thrones of both France and Spain, and dukes and grand dukes moved regularly between different dynastic states. The ability of rulers to move between states helped to contribute to the internationalist perspective that pervaded European relations and served to restrain the antagonisms that developed between states.

Additionally, because the powers did not feel that it was necessary or proper to intervene in the domestic affairs of another power, when faced with the threat of one power attempting to establish continental hegemony, the remaining powers would resort to a series of alliances to thwart the aggressor. This outlook, which was commonly shared among the ruling elites of Europe, helped to ensure the relatively smooth functioning of the balance of power system without extensive oversight and maintenance of the system.

A fifth factor that helped limit conflict was the fact that the European powers were able to expand their empires through colonization. This served as an important outlet, particularly for France, England and Spain as these countries were able to direct their expansionist desires away from the center of the European continent. Although it is true that colonial conflicts and cooperation played an important role in the overall quality of the relationship between the powers, colonial conflicts did not represent the threat of engulfing the entire European continent in war.

Conflicts that developed in the center of Europe, however, had a tendency to escalate horizontally very rapidly as the great powers became concerned over maintaining the balance of power on the European continent. Although colonial conflicts certainly added stress to continental problems, the major conflicts of the eighteenth century began when conflicts erupted in the center of the continent. Because the colonial powers were more concerned with expanding their empires, these countries supported diplomatic initiatives designed to maintain the balance so as to avoid continental entanglements, although the inability to restrain Frederick of Prussia produced a continent consumed by war. Despite the fact that the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War were devastating conflicts for Europe, they were relatively mild when compared with past and future conflicts, and a portion of this mild nature can be attributed to the fact that the European system was expanding and pushing conflicts away from the center of Europe.

Finally, the end product of all these factors resulted in the pursuit of limited military and diplomatic initiatives with limited means to accomplish them. The absence of nationalism and the relative ideological homogeneity of the period placed constraints on both the resources available to the dynastic rulers as well as limiting the rational under which these limited resources

could be used. Additionally, the general internationalist perspective and stability of the elites resulted in few of the rulers seeking to fight preemptive wars to preserve their rule, with Frederick of Prussia being the notable exception. Similarly, the desire for colonial expansion resulted in several of the great powers seeking to preserve the status quo on the European continent. The combination of these factors resulted in a system that could be characterized as one of limited means and limited ends.

The moderate and limited conduct of international diplomacy in the eighteenth century was radically altered by the events in France in 1789. The French Revolution resulted in the establishment of a French nation-state rather than the traditional dynastic-state. Additionally, the political and social reforms introduced in France, and the response of the remaining powers to those reforms, produced a fundamentally different ideological perspective amongst the ruling elites of France. However, to assert that the cause of international instability following the French Revolution was the sole responsibility of the forces of nationalism and ideology is incorrect. To determine what factors created instability in the international system following the French Revolution, this period must now be more closely examined.

¹Kyung-Won Kim, Revolution and International System, (New York: New York University Press, 1970), 4.

²Penfield Roberts, The Quest for Security 1715-1740, vol. 8 of The Rise of Modern Europe, ed. William L. Langer (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1947), 5.

³J. O. Lindsay, "International Relations," The Old Regime 1713-63, ed. J. O. Lindsay, vol. 7 of The New Cambridge Modern History, gen ed. J. P. T. Bury (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 194.

⁴Roberts, The Quest for Security 1715-1740, 8.

⁵Matthew Smith Anderson, Europe in the Eighteenth Century 1713-1783, (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, Inc., 1961), 177.

⁶Lindsay, "International Relations," 194-5.

⁷Walter L. Dorn, Competition for Empire 1740-1763, vol. 9 of The Rise of Modern Europe, ed. William L. Langer (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1940), 124.

⁸Lindsay, "International Relations," 207.

⁹*Ibid.*, 208.

¹⁰Dorn, Competition for Empire 1740-1763, 130.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 134.

¹²Mark A. Thomson, "The War of the Austrian Succession," The Old Regime 1713-63, ed. J. O. Lindsay, vol. 7 of The New Cambridge Modern History, gen ed. J. P. T. Bury (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 418.

¹³Leonard W. Cowie, Documents & Descriptions in European History 1714/1815, (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 55-6.

¹⁴Thomson, "The War of the Austrian Succession," 424-5.

¹⁵Dorn, Competition for Empire 1740-1763, 155.

¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷Thomson, "The War of the Austrian Succession," 431.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 432.

- ¹⁹Dorn, Competition for Empire 1740-1763, 158.
- ²⁰Anderson, Europe in the Eighteenth Century 1713-1783, 207.
- ²¹Ibid., 244.
- ²²Dorn, Competition for Empire 1740-1763, 294.
- ²³Cowie, Documents & Descriptions in European History 1714/1815, 62.
- ²⁴Ibid., 65.
- ²⁵Eric Robson, "The Seven Years War," The Old Regime 1713-63, ed. J. O. Lindsay, vol. 7 of The New Cambridge Modern History, gen ed. J. P. T. Bury (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 469.
- ²⁶Anderson, Europe in the Eighteenth Century 1713-1783, 212.
- ²⁷Dorn, Competition for Empire 1740-1763, 378.
- ²⁸R. R. Palmer, "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War," Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 91-5.
- ²⁹Dorn, Competition for Empire 1740-1763, 82.
- ³⁰Anderson, Europe in the Eighteenth Century 1713-1783, 155.
- ³¹Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 17.
- ³²Dorn, Competition for Empire 1740-1763, 5.

III. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The French Revolution had a profound impact on the international system. The balance of power system that had evolved during the eighteenth century was destroyed, and the moderate internationalist perspective of the ancien regime was replaced by an increasingly nationalist outlook. However, to assert that the emergence of both nationalism and a French nation that had widely divergent ideological views from the rest of Europe resulted in the destruction of the international system is incomplete at best. Although these factors played an important role, it was only after a combination of other factors had emerged that these forces were able to destroy the international system.

A. THE INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

The early stages of the French Revolution posed little threat to the international system. The balance of power system of the eighteenth century continued to function, and the antagonisms that existed were still the result of deep seated traditional rivalries and jealousies rather than ideological frictions. In England political reformers and those excluded from political life by the Test Act welcomed the principles of the Revolution, but to most Europeans the Revolution appeared as an interesting spectacle. Although

English public opinion gradually formed into two groups, with both an anti-revolutionary group and one that supported it, throughout the period of the monarchical experiment in France, the government of England led by William Pitt maintained a strict neutrality.¹

In Germany the Revolution received sympathetic curiosity, mainly from journalists and intellectuals. At Mainz, Gottingen, Brunswick and Hamburg, intellectual leaders such as Johannes von Muller, Forster, Schlozer, Stolberg, Maurillon and Klopstock supported the Revolution. Similarly, at Weimar, Herder, vice-president of the Consistory; Wieland, editor of Merkur; and Johann Paul Richter voiced their approval, although Goethe and Schiller were reluctant but did not declare themselves opposed.²

Despite the support for the Revolution demonstrated by the political reformers in England and various intellectuals in Germany, on the whole these countries were generally indifferent to the events in France. The support of the revolutionary principles in the Eastern European powers of Prussia, Austria, and European Russia, however, was considerably less. The Prussian peasant and middle classes lagged substantially behind their French counterparts in terms of development, and therefore they were both less inclined and less capable to fight for equality. Although the news of the fall of the Bastille was greeted with rejoicing and met with approval by Archenholz, an editor of

Ninerva; by Nicolai, editor of the Deutsche Bibliothek; and Reichardt, director of the Berlin Opera,³ the minister of justice Wollner's censorship had little difficulty in suppressing any pro-French propaganda.⁴

In Austria, the policies of reform that were implemented by Maria Theresa following the Seven Years War, and continued by Joseph II during the early portion of his reign, were mostly repealed. These policies, which were designed to promote greater state infrastructure development in order to support larger and stronger armed forces, produced a great political awakening among the non-privileged classes and jeopardized the stability of the aristocratic class. Joseph II, and later Leopold II may have been able to manage the domestic problems created by this "enlightened despotism", but these problems were intensified by the failure of Austrian foreign policy.

Joseph's foreign policy was centered around an alliance with Catherine II of Russia which was concluded in 1781. Joseph hoped that by detaching Russia from Prussia that he could obtain greater influence and prestige in Germany. Similarly, with Austrian support Catherine felt she could obtain territorial advantages in Turkey, particularly in the long coveted Crimean peninsula. These ambitions were put into affect in 1783 when Catherine acquired the Crimea from Turkey, aided by Austrian diplomatic pressure. However, when Joseph attempted to obtain Bavaria, Catherine's support

for Austrian ambitions was minimal, and Joseph suffered an embarrassing diplomatic defeat.⁵

Austria's alliance with Russia was even more damaging to Joseph when Catherine manipulated Austria into joining Russia in declaring war on Turkey in February 1788. The enormous financial requirements to support the army, coupled with the dislocation of trade and an unprecedented rise in prices, quickly ruined the reforms instituted by Joseph, and led the Hungarian nobility to revert to open opposition. This crisis was further complicated by the mobilization of Prussian, Polish and Saxon troops along the Austrian frontier. As a result of these foreign policy and domestic setbacks, Joseph II was compelled to make far reaching concessions to the aristocratic classes.⁶ The strength of this developing reactionary movement which developed prior to the French Revolution ensured that the revolutionary principles would have little effect in Austria.

Farther east, the combination of distance and poor communications served to substantially dampen the influence of the revolution in Russia. Only a handful of Russians, most notably Novikov, the poet Radischev, and Prince Gallitzin expressed liberal sympathies, but rather than forming into revolutionary groups and organizations, they expected liberal reforms to be instituted by the central government. Faced with the more pressing problems of the war with Turkey, Catherine and the nobility were unwilling

to implement reforms, and the weakness of the opposition ensured the continued dominance of the aristocratic class although some members of the bourgeois were allowed to discuss commercial and municipal affairs and peasants were placed theoretically under the protection of the law.⁷

Thus throughout Europe, the reaction to the French Revolution was one of indifference. Only Sweden's king Gustavus III advocated a crusade to restore the French monarchy, but the influence of Sweden in European affairs had diminished greatly, and the great powers were unwilling to pay the expense that would be associated to undertake a war against France. In fact, to the leaders of the great powers the French Revolution merely meant that France would be incapacitated in foreign affairs, and therefore the remaining powers would be able to benefit further at France's expense.⁸ Already the period of French decline that began after the Seven Years War had resulted in Austria, Prussia and Russia gaining territory through the First Partition of Poland in 1772, and the Russian annexation of the Crimea in 1783. Since France had long supported Poland and Turkey, the aggrandizement of Austria, Prussia and Russia without some form of compensation for France demonstrated the decline of French influence in Europe prior to the Revolution,⁹ and with further domestic turmoil it was believed that greater gains could be obtained at France's expense.

B. THE UNDERMINING OF INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

The assumption by the great powers that they would benefit at France's expense was based on the belief that the international system would continue to operate in its traditional eighteenth century manner. However, the previously mentioned gains made by Prussia, Russia and Austria without compensation to France already indicated that the traditional workings of the system were in jeopardy. The "rules of the game" were altered even more radically when in early August of 1789 the representative of the nobles, Viconte de Noailles, voluntarily surrendered all feudal rights and privileges, resulting in the National Assembly of France announcing an end to the feudal regime. This proclamation was followed by the Declaration of the Rights of Man on August 27. These two acts had significant implications for future events, although at the time the real significance of these events was less clear to those who observed them.

The weakening of the royal authority in France led to the flight of sizeable numbers of the French nobility. These French emigres spread anti-revolutionary propaganda throughout Europe, but they were particularly influential in Austria and Prussia for two primary reasons. First, in the province of Alsace, over which the French Bourbons had claimed sovereignty, the German princes became alarmed by France's public disavowal of all feudal rights and

obligations, and realized that the revolutionary principles represented a direct threat to their rule over their dominions. Austria and Prussia, as the primary competitors for influence and prestige in Germany were therefore eager to defend the feudal rights of the German princes in order to expand their influence in the German principalities.¹⁰

The disorders of 1789 also caused a severe economic crises for the French national treasury. To alleviate the crises the National Assembly sought to confiscate certain property. Since the confiscation of private property was contrary to the principles of the revolution and the rights of man, an alternative would have to be found. The alternative was to seize the properties of the church, since it represented a corporation rather than a private person.¹¹ This action was met with great protest by Pope Pius VI, who could count on support from the Austrian emperor Leopold.

The anti-revolutionary support that these two factors produced was perhaps insufficient to lead Prussia and Austria to oppose France, but the dramatic and celebrated flight of Louis XVI in June 1791 forced their hands. Although many of the reforms enacted by the National Assembly contributed to the decision of Louis to attempt to flee Paris, the event that precipitated this action was the condemnation of the civil constitution and the political and social reforms of the Revolution by Pope Pius VI in March and April 1791.

The condemnation by the Pope was the result of a long struggle over church reform following the Revolution. The National Assembly's reforms resulted in reducing the prestige and authority of the bishops by depriving them of all but their purely spiritual or ecclesiastical functions. Additionally, the reforms reduced the number of dioceses in France from 135 to 83.¹²

The reforms endorsed by the National Assembly were not submitted for approval to the French church, and as a result the church was presented a virtual ultimatum and left the bishops with the difficult task of negotiating its acceptance with the papacy. The National Assembly believed that the papacy would eventually consent because the Assembly could threaten to annex the papal enclaves of Avignon and Venaissin that resided on French territory. Relations between the papacy and the Assembly were strained further when on 20 November 1790 the Assembly required the French clergy to take an oath that required them to uphold the constitution decreed by the Assembly. Although the majority of the French bishops refused to take the oath, the majority of the lower clergy submitted. In support of the French bishops, Pius condemned the Assembly's act. This condemnation resulted in numerous retractions by the clergy who had taken the oath and caused the majority of French bishops to emigrate. These events persuaded Louis XVI of the necessity to break with the Revolution and seek safety by fleeing Paris.¹³

The flight of the King and his family on 20 June 1791 was one of the most important events of the Revolution. The king's attempted escape was halted at Varennes, and he was returned to Paris under heavy guard. The news of the flight produced a storm of invective protests against the royal family, and raised fears that an invasion of France was imminent.¹⁴

The arrest of Louis XVI and the suspension of his powers resulted in the Austrian Emperor Leopold II, who was the brother of the French queen, to take an active diplomatic stance to safeguard the interests of the French monarchy. On 6 July 1791 Leopold forwarded the Padau Circular to the empress of Russia and the kings of England, Prussia, Spain, Naples and Sardinia. The circular urged the need for concerted action "...to vindicate the liberty and honour of the most Christian King and his family to limit the dangerous extremes of the French revolution."¹⁵ Although initially some hesitation existed in Russia, and England refused to commit itself, the anti-French coalition gained strength on 25 July when Prussia and Austria, historical rivals, concluded a preliminary defensive alliance designed to produce a European concert for the settlement of French affairs.¹⁶

It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of these declarations on the French National Assembly. The Assembly exercised prudent moderation in not dethroning Louis,

however, this moderation can be just as easily be attributed to the moderates that broke away from the Jacobins and formed the Feuillant club. However, to Leopold it appeared that the situation in Paris had been stabilized by his initiative, and therefore the decision was made to continue to exert diplomatic pressure on the revolutionaries in France. On 27 August 1791 Frederick William II of Prussia and Leopold issued the Declaration of Pillnitz. The declaration called for the joint effort of all European sovereigns to help Louis restore a monarchical system in France. Since England had previously refused to commit itself to the Padua Circular, however, it was unlikely that a joint effort could be agreed upon. Since Austria and Prussia had no intention of acting without the support of all the European monarchies, this declaration was essentially ineffective from the outset.

Despite this ineffectiveness, its effect on the French revolutionaries was dramatic. The declaration fueled French fears of counter-revolutionary actions from Austria and Prussia; and the actions of the French emigres, German princes and the Pope contributed to this feeling. The fears of counter-revolution also served to undermine the National Assembly, for although it had been able to secure the acceptance of a revised constitution by Louis on 14 September 1791, it was largely perceived as having pandered to the special interests of the middle class and Feuillants.

Additionally, the popular outcry against the monarch as a result of his flight made the establishment of a constitutional monarchy unlikely. As a result, the assembly dissolved itself on 30 September and a new body, the Legislative Assembly was convened on 1 October.

The Legislative Assembly almost immediately turned its attention to the threats of counter-revolution. The right wing parties comprised of the constitutionalists, royalists and Feuillants lost strength almost daily as the left wing parties of the Plain, Girondists and the Mountain increased. This shift in strength is partially attributed to the continued flight of the aristocratic class and the revenues they took with them. The flight of capital from France resulted in a depreciation of the French assignats, and led many of the revolutionaries to blame the deteriorating economic conditions on the royalist supporters.¹⁷ This problem led to the decree of 9 November 1791 that imposed on all emigres who had joined the armed concentration outside French frontiers to repatriate themselves by 1 January 1792 or face the penalties of treason and the confiscation of their property.¹⁸

Additionally, the Girondists were concerned with the armed companies of emigres assembled on the territory of the elector of Treves, and as a result on 29 November the Assembly requested Louis to summon the elector to dissolve them. Since the elector was a prince of the Holy Roman

Empire, however, he would undoubtedly seek advice and aid from the Imperial Diet and the emperor. On December 14, Louis announced that he was sending the summons, and the minister of war Narbonne followed this with a request to call up three armies.¹⁹ The mobilization of troops was supported by both the right and the left in the Assembly. The royalists viewed any potential conflict as a means to restore the strength of the monarchy through control of the army, while the left supported the potential conflict as a war of defense against the unjust aggressions of the monarchies of Europe.

When the elector of Treves received the summons, he turned to the emperor Leopold for help. Though he was not particularly sympathetic towards the emigres, he informed the elector that he would provide protection only if the emigres were dispersed by the end of December. The emigres were thus disbanded, and the threat of immediate intervention was removed. However, on the basis of these new threats Leopold resumed his policy of intimidation, renewing the threats made at Pillnitz and concluding an alliance between Austria and Prussia on 7 February 1792. Despite the death of Leopold on 1 March and the accession of Francis II, the process of intimidation continued. Faced with increasing pressures, France seized the initiative and prepared to march into Belgium in late March, and on 20 April France declared war against the king of Bohemia and Hungary.²⁰

The War of the First Coalition against France however did not mark the destruction of the international system that had developed during the eighteenth century, nor was the war the total ideological clash that it would later develop into. In this early stage of the conflict, however, several key factors were already emerging that would eventually contribute to the destruction of the classical balance of power system.

The first factor was the instability of elites that developed in both the German principalities in Alsace and within France. The German princes, concerned over the abolishment of aristocratic privileges within their domains became exceedingly apprehensive about the solidity of their rule. This apprehensiveness led to appeals to both the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor for protection to stabilize their positions.

In France, the instability that developed within the elite ruling classes was particularly dangerous due to the bipolarization of French society. Supporters of the monarchy were under constant threat from the liberal excesses of the revolution, and the flight of many emigres reinforced this instability as the aristocratic class rapidly decreased in size. The revolutionaries were also extremely unstable as the threat of counter-revolution was well known as both the emigres and the king had engaged in foreign intrigues to restore the strength of the monarchy.

The revolutionaries were also destabilized by the breakdown of the French economy following the revolution. Inflation had already developed by the time of the War of the First Coalition, and thus the National and later the Legislative Assembly was faced with both internal and external threats. The flight of the king to Varennes reinforced the perception of the external counter-revolutionary threat as the majority of the French felt that the king was attempting to leave the country to organize a counter-revolutionary crusade. Although it is possible that the external threats to the elites could have been solved diplomatically, this course of action was highly unlikely because of the effects that a second factor was having on the international system.

The second factor that emerged was the breakdown in the cohesiveness of the international system, although it would not be until later in the conflict that the international system would be completely destroyed. Still, the Revolution had a critical impact on the political structures of France, and the elites who now controlled foreign policy making decisions viewed interstate relations in a fundamentally different way from the elites of the ancien regime. This fundamental difference was perhaps best exemplified by the National Assembly on 22 May 1790 when it renounced "...in the name of the French nation all wars of conquest, and promised never to employ French forces against the liberty of a people."²¹ The differences in outlook of the French

and the ancien regime would become exacerbated as the monarchs of Europe would continue to conduct international affairs along classic eighteenth century lines. The failure of the European powers to accommodate revolutionary France and incorporate France into the existing international system, as shall be seen later, had an extremely destabilizing impact on the international system as the feedback that occurred between the two perspectives led to the polarization of the international system and eventually resulted in an ideological war between the antagonists.

Finally, the conflict that erupted in 1792 was in the center of Europe and the international system. Throughout the eighteenth century conflicts that developed in the heart of the European continent tended to escalate horizontally as the great powers became quickly involved to maintain the balance of power. Although it is true that colonial conflicts often reverberated back to Europe and increased tensions on the continent, the great conflicts of the eighteenth century were all precipitated by a clash on the continent.

C. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM INTENSIFIES

Although at the outbreak of the War of the First Coalition the classical balance of power system was not destroyed, the previously mentioned factors served to weaken the system considerably. Although it might have been

possible to restore the system through a concerted effort by the coalition monarchies, the events that took place during the war would eventually destroy the system.

The survival of revolutionary France during the critical years 1792 to 1794 was not the result of French strength but rather the result of the ineptitude of the coalition formed against it. The coalition monarchies did not yet realize the threat that France posed to the international system, and therefore they continued to conduct themselves along classic eighteenth century lines. This contributed significantly to the destruction of the international system for two primary reasons. First, concerns over territorial compensations, particularly the partition of Poland, prevented the coalition from concentrating its efforts to end the French problems. Second, by continuing to operate along classical lines, the coalition provided feedback that further radicalized the French Revolutionary process as the "evils" preached by the revolutionaries about the European monarchical system came to be perceived as true. This development led to a revolutionizing of the war and eventually allowed it to take on its ideological form.

The war started with the French intending to overrun the Austrian Netherlands with 50,000 men in a decisive and rapid thrust. The Girondist ministry led by Dumouriez believed that French revolutionary propaganda would result in the French being received as liberators beyond their borders,

and therefore concerns over the readiness of the army was less important than taking bold action. The French generals Luckner, Rochambeau, and Lafayette, as well as the officer corps, however, were fairly well trained for war and did not fully support the adventurous proposals of Dumouriez. Additionally, the officers distrusted the undisciplined troops, and the enlisted personnel suspected the officers of treason as large numbers of officers continued to emigrate.

The lack of confidence and distrust that existed throughout the French armies had serious repercussions at the beginning of the conflict. On 29 April 1792 the French, under the command of Dillon and Firon were ordered into a retreat upon the first sighting of Austrian troops. Similarly, Carle and Lafayette withdrew before even sighting the enemy. These actions led the enlisted personnel to cry treason and disband. By June the French offensive had failed, with the generals blaming the poor discipline and inadequate training as the reasons, although the generals had shown no will to fight.²²

Despite the troubles experienced by the French army, the allies were unable to take advantage of the situation. Like the French revolutionaries, the French emigres convinced the allies that they would be greeted in France as liberators. Bolstered by these proclamations, Prussian and Austrian forces invaded France in the summer of 1792. By September, the allies had reached Valmy, one hundred miles east of

Paris. The invasion of France, coupled with the deteriorating economic conditions provided fertile grounds for further revolutionary Girondist propaganda as many French citizens were convinced that a clandestine committee was passing millions in gold to Austria, paying emigres, causing the financial crises by deliberately buying up the French market, and divulging French military plans to the enemy.²³

The combination of the poor performance of the French army and Girondist propaganda served to further polarize French society. The Girondist ministry issued three revolutionary decrees in late May and early June to remove nonjuring priests, disband the King's personal bodyguards, and raise a new levee of 20,000 men to set up military camps in Paris to remove the enemies of the republic. Louis XVI realized that these decrees would make him a captive of the Girondins, and because Louis felt that the conflict that had erupted would restore the strength of the monarchy, he vetoed two of the bills, most importantly the establishment of the military camps. Roland, head of the interior ministry, urged the King to accept the decrees to prevent violent consequences, but Dumouriez, who believed that he could enhance his personal power and prestige convinced Louis to dismiss Roland, and elevate himself to war minister. Dumouriez's appointment was not well received by the Assembly and within a week Dumouriez was forced to resign his ministerial post.²⁴

The fall of the Girondist Ministry and its replacement by the new Feuillant ministry resulted in the Parisian sans-culottes of the democratic faubourgs invading the Tuileries palace on 20 June to force the King to restore the Girondist ministers. The demonstration failed to intimidate Louis, and attempts by General Lafayette to disband the Jacobin and other radical clubs failed as the Assembly refused to support strong measures to halt further revolutionary activities.

As the external threat became greater, the actions of the Girondins and the Assembly resulted in the intervention of extra-parliamentary forces. The Girondin leaders "invited" units of the national guards, including the provisional federes, to attend the Festival of Federation on 14 July.²⁵ On 5 July the Assembly declared that in the event of danger to the nation, all able bodied men would be called to service and arms requisitioned. On 9 July Brissot accused the king and his ministers of treason, and implied that the king might be deposed. Faced with this increasing revolutionary activity, the Feuillant ministry resigned on 10 July, opening up the possibility of a return of the Girondins. The Girondins, anxious to restore their lost power made the fateful decision to seek the support of the King instead of siding with the increasingly revolutionary populace. As a result, they now became defenders of the throne. On 11 July the Assembly declared "the Fatherland in

danger", further heightening political tensions and tilting the political balance increasingly to the side of the revolutionaries.²⁶

The increasing revolutionary situation in Paris, coupled with the pleas from Marie Antoinette for the issue of an ultimatum to restrain the fury of the Parisians until troops arrived resulted in the Brunswick Manifesto of 11 July. The manifesto required "...the city of Paris and all its inhabitants, without distinction ... to submit at once and without delay to the King." Additionally, "If any force or insult is used against the Palace of the Tuileries, if the least violence or the least outrage is done Their Majesties ..." the allied powers would "...exact an exemplary and forever memorable vengeance by delivering the city of Paris to military execution and total subversion, and the rebels who are guilty of such outrages to the punishments they will have deserved."²⁷

The publication of the manifesto in Paris on 1 August had the opposite affect that its drafters intended. The federes and the Jacobin club had already listened to Robespierre's radical program calling for the overthrow of the monarchy and the displacement of the Legislative Assembly, and on 3 August forty-seven of the forty-eight Parisian sections petitioned the Assembly for the deposition of Louis XVI. The manifesto had thus heightened the fears of counter-revolution throughout these radical groups, and

as a result the Palace of the Tuileries was stormed on 10 August and the King was suspended from his duties.

The delegates from the sections who had met to plan the insurrection established the revolutionary Commune of Paris. The Commune imprisoned the King and his family in the Temple, and then called for a National Convention to be elected by universal suffrage. The Legislative Assembly remained in existence until the 20 September although its strength and influence diminished almost daily.

As domestic conditions deteriorated in France during the period of the "second revolution", the military threat increased. On 19 August Prussian armies under Brunswick crossed the French frontier, and shortly thereafter broke through the fortresses at Longwy and Verdun.²⁸ Lafayette, who had tried to turn back his army to rescue the monarchy fled to Austria on 20 August where he would later be imprisoned.

When news of the military misfortunes reached Paris, what little authority remained collapsed. Rumors began to circulate that the criminals in the Paris prisons were covertly aiding the enemy and the emigres. This resulted in the September Massacres as between 1090 and 1395²⁹ criminal and political prisoners were killed between 2 and 7 September, a foretaste of the terror that was yet to come as the revolutionaries sought to eliminate the threat of counter-revolution from within.

The Prussian advance continued as conditions deteriorated in France. Brunswick had maneuvered his troops between the French army commanded by Dumouriez and Paris, leaving Paris open to invasion. Dumouriez sent for reinforcements from Kellermann's army, and on the morning of 20 September Brunswick's and Kellermann's troops came into contact with one another near the hills around the village of Valmy. Dumouriez' army came up in support, and in the morning fog a large artillery exchange took place. The famous battle was really not much of an encounter, and although it was the largest artillery exchange to date, only 180 Prussian and 300 French soldiers were killed.³⁰ As the weather conditions deteriorated with the onset of fall and winter, and sickness set in amongst the troops, the cabinets at Vienna and Berlin decided to withdraw their troops until France was further weakened from internal conflict. Additionally, both Prussia and Austria were much more concerned with the events taking place in Poland.

The events in Poland were critical to the survival of the French Revolution. Russia, which had already gained from the First Partition of Poland in 1772 had launched another assault on the truncated Polish state. Austria and Prussia, as well as England, Sweden and Turkey viewed the attempted Russian expansion as a threat to the European system as one of the powers was attempting to expand and increase its influence. At the time this was considered the

greater threat to Europe as Russia was seen as seeking to alter the balance of power in its favor. Although Prussia and Austria desired to restore the French monarchy, this restoration could wait for a more precipitous moment. The events in Poland prevented the two powers from concentrating their military efforts against France during the time when the French army was perhaps its most vulnerable. Although in hindsight this is now more clearly seen, it illustrates an important point about how the international system would become increasingly unstable.

D. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The international system of the eighteenth century was slow to react and adapt to a revolutionary actor. The leaders of the ancien regime continued to operate along classic balance of power lines and did not perceive the threat that France posed to the underlying values that the system was built upon. It was this threat, and not the one of Russian expansion that threatened to radically alter the eighteenth century European system.

Intoxicated by the withdrawal of allied forces from Valmy and the revolutionary advances made in August, on 21 September 1792 the National Convention abolished the monarchy and established a republic. These events and the September Massacres resulted in revolutionary France at least temporarily removing the threat of counterrevolution,

and with greater self confidence France began to assert itself against the monarchies of a hostile Europe. Within three months French armies occupied Mainz, Speyer and Brussels, and France annexed Savoy and Nice.³¹ The French occupation of these areas resulted in local patriots requesting French protection from counter-revolutionary reprisals. These requests produced the Edict of Fraternity issued on 19 November 1792 which stated: "The National Convention declares in the name of the French nation that it will accord fraternity and assistance to all peoples who wish to recover their liberty. It charges the executive power to give the generals the necessary orders for bearing help to these peoples and defending citizens who are vexed for the cause of liberty."³²

Although the French foreign minister Lebrun attempted to explain that the edict only applied to those countries engaged in war with France, French sympathizers throughout Europe hailed the French proclamation as a symbol of French desires to liberate the remainder of Europe. The conservative monarchs of Europe interpreted the decree as a direct challenge to their rule. Thus the conflict that was initially perceived by France as a defensive effort against the allies had now turned into an ideological struggle as the French Revolutionary principles became opposed to those of the European monarchies. Additionally, despite Lebrun's efforts, the true French intentions were revealed by Brissot

on 26 November when he argued that the Republic of France, engaged in a death struggle with the "German colossus" could not be "...at ease until Europe, and all of Europe, is in flames." Additionally, Brissot demanded the Rhine as a frontier and proclaimed "...our liberty will never rest quietly as long as a Bourbon is enthroned. There can be no peace with a Bourbon; with that understood we must consider an expedition into Spain."³³

The ideological nature of the war was further polarized in December when Dumouriez was unable to obtain local loans in Belgium to meet his military expenditures. As a result, on 15 December the Convention declared that war expenditures incurred during the liberation of subject people abroad would be defrayed by introducing the French assignats into liberated areas. The assignats would be secured by the sequestered property of the clerical and noble estates.³⁴ As Lefebvre points out, this "...war for chateaux; peace for cottages..." decree instituted the "...dictatorship of revolutionary minorities under the protection of French bayonets, and undertook to secure the fortunes of other peoples without consulting them, at their expense."³⁵ The final ideological break between France and the rest of Europe occurred on 21 January 1793 when Louis XVI was guillotined.

The execution of Louis XVI further strained the relations between many of the neutral monarchs of Europe and

the French republic. In England William Pitt had succeeded in maintaining England's neutrality, although French revolutionary propaganda continued to irritate England's ruling elite. A series of royal edicts combined with government subsidized conservative propaganda, however, successfully countered this threat. As Dumouriez of France began to press for military entry into Holland, however, thereby threatening to take over Europe's largest banking center as well as an ally of England, foreign relations between the two countries deteriorated rapidly. The execution of the king served as a pretext to war. On 24 January the Marquis de Chauvelin was given his passport from England, a clear signal that England was prepared to break diplomatic relations with France. Rather than wait for Chauvelin's expulsion, the French recalled him the next day. On 1 February 1793 the National Convention voted for a declaration of war against England.

The execution of the king also had a dramatic affect on French foreign relations with Spain and the Holy Roman Empire. Louis' trial provoked demonstrations in Spain against France, and it soon became apparent that Madrid's neutrality depended upon the verdict. After 21 January, French proposals for neutrality were summarily refused. On 7 March France declared war against Spain. With Spain now involved in the war, English access to the Mediterranean was virtually assured, and the increased English naval presence

allowed the states of Italy greater freedom of action in joining the allies.

The ideological character of the war was brought about by the complex interplay of the revolutionary forces in France and the reaction of the international system. The failure of the monarchical experiment was in no way inevitable at the outset. However, the structure of government in France was substantially weakened following the events of 1789, and attempts by the monarchs of Europe to strengthen the French government through external actions to support Louis XVI only exacerbated the problem. The rhetoric of the allies heightened fears of a counter-revolution, reinforcing the radicalism of the more revolutionary Jacobin and Mountain parties. Additionally, during this "age of democratic revolution", it was only natural that some democratization in foreign policy would occur, and as these parties grew in strength, French foreign policy became increasingly susceptible to their influence, which then triggered even harsher outbursts from the allies as evidenced by the Padua Circular and the Pillnitz and Brunswick Declarations. The outbreak of war completed the radicalization of French society as the weakened political structures could not cope with the shocks produced by the military defeats that were suffered in the summer of 1792.

Although ideology had now become an important element in the international system, the capacity of the balance of

power system to contain France had not yet been exceeded. It was still possible for the allies either to tacitly accept the revolution by abandoning the provocative rhetoric against France, thereby increasing French security and hopefully diminishing the ideological character that the war had assumed, or to launch a large scale counter-revolutionary effort to restore the monarchical system. Instead, the allies fell between two stools and chose to continue their rhetorical assault while pursuing the traditional eighteenth century diplomacy that stressed limited territorial aims achieved with limited means. The allied policies, when coupled with the instabilities that existed in France resulted in an unprecedented feeling of patriotism throughout France. This rising patriotism would later contribute significantly to the collapse of the international system as rising nationalism substantially altered key factors in the balance of power system.

England's entry into the anti-French coalition resulted in a significant horizontal escalation of the conflict as the combination of English diplomacy, subsidies, and naval pressure extended the number of allies. The allied forces were therefore able to successfully expel the French from the Rhineland and the Austrian Netherlands. Dumouriez, whose army was defeated and thereby lost most of the Netherlands, defected to the Austrians. These events, coupled with the Royalist support of the peasant revolt over

the issue of conscription that occurred in the Vendée in March increased revolutionary activity in France and forced the Convention to create institutions to eliminate internal opposition and strengthen the Republican armies. In April, the Convention established the Committee of General Security and the Committee of Public Safety. These two committees, but mainly the Committee of Public Safety, soon exercised dictatorial powers through the leadership of Danton and Robespierre. The arrest of 31 Girondist deputies on 2 June ensured radical domination of the committees.

The Committee of Public Safety began to establish the mechanisms that would eventually lead to the Reign of Terror. However, despite the increasing control over the internal opposition, France continued to suffer military setbacks in the summer of 1793. However, just as during the previous allied assault on France, once again the European powers continued to operate along classic eighteenth century lines, and rather than marching on Paris, England broke off towards Dunkirk and the Austrian's towards Maubeuge as both countries attempted to obtain territory which could be used as pawns for the coming peace conference.³⁶ Similarly, Prussia and Russia, which had become engaged in another series of intrigues over the Second Partition of Poland in January of 1793, were once again more concerned with the events in Poland and the exclusion of Austria from the Polish agreement a policy that would create divisions within the alliance.

Although the allies of the First Coalition all had different war aims, the allies also suffered from an inability to exploit their resources. The people of France were much more willing to make sacrifices because they perceived that the revolutionary regime was responsible for the liberal freedoms that they had obtained. By contrast, the allies were much less willing to ask for sacrifices out of fear that concessions would be demanded in return. The failure of the allies to decisively defeat France provided the revolutionary government the time to adopt extreme measures to combat the external threats to the Republic. On 23 August 1793 French patriotism reached new heights when a levy was placed in principle on every Frenchman and Frenchwoman: "Young men will go to the front; married men will forge arms and transport foodstuffs; women will tear rags into lint; old men will get themselves carried to public places, there to stir up the courage of the warriors, hatred of kings and unity in the republic."³⁷

The lack of unity among the allies was exploited by the French revolutionary generals who assumed the offensive and cleared France of invaders. It is important to note that this was accomplished prior to the mobilization of French society, as the allied defeat was accomplished with only the levy of 300,000 men that had been requisitioned at the beginning of the war. This had an important influence on

French nationalism as it was transformed from Risorgimento nationalism, which is defined as the liberation from political and social oppression, to integral nationalism, which espoused slogans about national supremacy and superiority of the French nation and resulted in French territorial expansion.³⁸ The fact that French mobilization did not become effective until after France had assumed the offensive was important psychologically for French citizens. The hardships endured by the French citizens through the dislocation of large numbers of the population, coupled with its accompanying affect on societal production that resulted in the establishment of the maximum price policy on large numbers of consumer goods, may have resulted in the collapse of the revolutionary government had they been in effect during the period of French setbacks in early 1793. Since these hardships came into effect during a time when the French had gained the offensive, however, it decreased the impact of these hardships on French society, at least psychologically as the French citizens were able to console themselves with the fact that their sacrifices resulted in French victories. The French victories thus had an intoxicating affect on French society as it became consumed by the exuberance of victory.

The development of nationalism in France was another important factor in the destruction of the eighteenth century international system, primarily through its affects

on the limited form of warfare of the eighteenth century and on international diplomacy. The adoption of a policy of near universal conscription, which could only be tolerated by a nationalistic society, produced a great increase in the number of soldiers available to the French generals.

Besides allowing the French generals to fight more aggressive and costly campaigns and more of them, French foreign policy now carried more weight. Additionally, by supplying armies through requisitions from occupied territories, the French were able to break away from many of the restraints imposed on armies during the eighteenth century.³⁹

The rapid expansion of the military manpower base represented by the growth of nationalism in France produced a serious imbalance in the international system. Still it was possible that the international system could have survived with this imbalance had the French maintained the international perspective and cosmopolitan outlook of the ancien regime. However, the combination of nationalism and ideology dramatically affected the conduct of international relations. The French ideas of social equality, political rights and economic liberalism challenged the eighteenth century aristocratic order and undermined the diplomacy that was based on conservative social principles. This division was exacerbated by the infusion of French nationalism as it now became standard practice to abolish the internal

constitution of conquered states and replace it with the new principles espoused by the revolution.

The defeat of the allies by the French in the War of the First Coalition marked the end of the eighteenth century international system. The period of limited ends and limited means had come to a close as the French Republic, filled with self confidence and self righteousness, embarked on a mission to remake the whole of Europe in its image. Stability would only return to the international system after French nationalism had been transplanted to the rest of Europe, establishing a balance of resources available to both the French and the allies. Additionally, the allies had to overcome their traditional methods of conducting diplomacy and war that generally stressed separate aims, and instead build a mechanism upon which unity of purpose existed. It was only after these events occurred that peace and tranquility would return to the European continent.

E. SUMMARY

The breakdown of the international system during the French Revolution was the result of many factors, however, it appears that a few key factors contributed significantly to this breakdown. The first factor was a breakdown in the stability of the ruling elites in Europe. This began first in France as the product of the domestic turmoil that undermined the monarchy, and then expanded to the German

principalities with the abolishment by France of feudal privileges in Alsace. Elite stability was further undermined by the rhetorical proclamations and declarations issued by both the revolutionaries and the monarchs of Europe, as both sides sought to re-establish their own systems by threatening to destroy the other's. These actions planted the seeds for the ideological struggle that would soon develop.

A second factor, and one that encompasses the entire revolutionary period, is the failure of the non-revolutionary powers of Europe to adjust to a revolutionary France as the allies continued to operate along classic eighteenth century military-diplomatic lines. Since France had already renounced a great majority of the principles that comprised the foundation of the international system through the abolishment of feudal privileges, the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and the renunciation of "all wars of conquest", the allied actions provided feedback to France that served to further revolutionize French society. The French revolutionaries were able to point out that the monarchical system was directly opposed to the liberal reforms of France, adding credence to the assertions that the dynastic system was inherently repressive. Had the allies more fully realized the changes that revolutionary France posed to the international system, they could have either tacitly

accepted the Revolution and attempted to reach an accommodation with France, something not out of the realm of the possible in the early stages of the French Revolution, or they could have better coordinated their efforts to defeat France. The allied actions during this critical period illustrates the limits of the preexisting statesmanship during periods of revolutionary change.

Third, as during previous periods of instability in Europe, conflict had once again erupted in the center of Europe. Although this may seem like a trivial point, it is tremendously important because of the fact that any conflict on the continent affected the balance amongst the powers and therefore the threat of horizontal escalation was much greater. The period of colonization and expansion was temporarily ended as once again the major powers were entangled on the continent. The relief valve for the European powers was now removed, and the continent suffered terribly for it.

Fourth, the force of ideology became a driving factor in international relations. The new ideology was important because it destroyed the commonality of outlook amongst the ruling elites and hampered their ability to reach agreements and consensus regarding international relations as both sides perceived the world in a fundamentally different way.

A fifth factor was the emergence of nationalism. This factor was important because it allowed France to expand its

resources base beyond the point that the international system could balance. French nationalism produced a tremendous imbalance in the international system, an imbalance which had to be corrected before stability could be restored.

The combination of ideology and nationalism produced a sixth factor, namely the loss of internationalist perspective. France was no longer concerned with maintaining the balance in Europe, but instead sought to reshape Europe in its own image. The cosmopolitan nature of eighteenth century Europe had been destroyed and was replaced by an increasingly nationalist one.

Finally, the period of the French Revolution was characterized by a diplomacy that consisted of unlimited ends pursued with enormously expanded means. The constraints placed on the dynastic rulers by the eighteenth century international system had been removed through the development of nationalism and ideology, making the pursuit of grander goals more achievable, particularly from the French perspective.

The destruction of the international system and the violence that coincided with it was the result of the presence of all these factors. Individual factors, although capable of producing instability by themselves, could not have had the dramatic affect on the international system that the combination noted above created.

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³Ibid.

⁴E. Wangermann, "The Habsburg Possessions and Germany," The American and French Revolutions 1763-90, ed. A. Goodwin, vol. 8 of The New Cambridge Modern History, gen ed. J. P. T. Bury (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 302.

⁵Ibid., 294-6.

⁶Ibid., 301-2.

⁷Brinton, A Decade of Revolution 1789-1799, 180-1.

⁸Ibid., 83.

⁹Geoffrey Bruun, "The Balance of Power During the Wars, 1793-1814," War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval 1793-1830, ed. C. W. Crawley, vol. 9 of The New Cambridge Modern History, gen ed. J. P. T. Bury (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 250-5.

¹⁰Kyung-Won Kim, Revolution and International System, (New York: New York University Press, 1970), 23.

¹¹Brinton, A Decade of Revolution 1789-1799, 47.

¹²A. Goodwin, "Reform and Revolution in France: October 1789-February 1793," The American and French Revolutions 1763-90, ed. A. Goodwin, vol. 8 of The New Cambridge Modern History, gen ed. J. P. T. Bury (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 687-9.

¹³Ibid., 689.

¹⁴Lefebvre, The French Revolution from its Origins to 1793, 206.

¹⁵Goodwin, "Reform and Revolution in France: October 1789-February 1793," 693.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Brinton, A Decade of Revolution 1789-1799, 54.

¹⁸Goodwin, "Reform and Revolution in France: October 1789-February 1793," 697.

¹⁹Lefebvre, The French Revolution from its Origins to 1793, 216-8.

²⁰Ibid., 226.

²¹Brinton, A Decade of Revolution 1789-1799, 55.

²²Lefebvre, The French Revolution from its Origins to 1793, 228-9.

²³Kim, Revolution and International System, 38.

²⁴Ibid., 40.

²⁵Goodwin, "Reform and Revolution in France: October 1789-February 1793," 703.

²⁶Lefebvre, The French Revolution from its Origins to 1793, 234-5.

²⁷R. R. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution A Political History of Europe and America, 1760-1800, vol. 1, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 37.

²⁸Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World, (New York: Collier Books, 1985), 106.

²⁹Lefebvre, The French Revolution from its Origins to 1793, 243.

³⁰Ropp, War in the Modern World, 107.

³¹Bruun, "The Balance of Power During the Wars, 1793-1814," 254.

³²Leonard W. Cowie, Documents and Descriptions in European History 1714-1815, (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 166.

³³Kim, Revolution and International System, 45.

³⁴Goodwin, "Reform and Revolution in France: October 1789-February 1793," 709-10.

³⁵Lefebvre, The French Revolution from its Origins to 1793, 277.

³⁶Ropp, War in the Modern World, 109.

³⁷Brinton, A Decade of Revolution 1789-1799, 128.

³⁸Peter Alter, Nationalism, (London: Edward Arnold, 1989), 39.

³⁹Peter Paret, "Napoleon and the Revolution in War," Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 125.

IV. EUROPE BETWEEN REVOLUTIONS: A RETURN TO STABILITY

Restoring stability and a balance of power in Europe was one of the primary goals of the leaders and diplomats that gathered in Vienna periodically from October 1814 thru June 1815. The statesmen of Europe, however, had another and more important goal, namely moving past a mere ending of hostilities to devise a system that would prevent future conflict. This goal was alluded to by Prince Clemens von Metternich of Austria, one of the leading statesmen and chief architects of the Congress of Vienna when he stated: "On this occasion, peace had already been made and the parties meet as friends who, though differing in their interests, wish to work together towards the conclusion and affirmation of the existing treaty."¹

A. THE RESTORATION OF COOPERATION AMONG THE POWERS

The cooperation that was necessary to form a "Concert of Europe" began to form in the winter of 1812-1813 following Napoleon's retreat from Moscow. By this stage of the Napoleonic Wars the statesmen of Europe had come to realize that only a unity of effort and war aims would result in the defeat of a resource and population rich France. Despite this realization, the continental powers were already experiencing strains in their relationship as their

interests conflicted over the division of the war spoils and the balance of power. Alexander of Russia sought to establish a united and autonomous kingdom of Poland out of the territories formerly partitioned between Russia, Austria and Prussia. Prussia would be compensated with territory in Saxony, and Austria would be free to annex territories in Italy. Alexander's grand design may have been achievable except for the fact that Alexander had intended to maintain a protectorate over the Polish state, a situation that was totally unacceptable to Austria. Although Alexander did not specifically announce his intentions, Austria was keenly aware of Russian designs and warned Berlin "If the Polish question remains unsettled, there is the danger that we may exchange the yoke of Napoleon for the yoke of Alexander."² To avoid alienating Austria and undermining the formation of a new coalition against France, Russia and Prussia signed the Treaty of Kalisch on 20 February 1813, an extremely vague document that made no mention of territorial divisions although it served to unify the Russian and Prussian effort against France.

Although Metternich felt that Napoleon's retreat from Moscow marked the beginning of the end of French domination on the continent, Austria remained uncommitted to the Russian-Prussian alliance. Metternich desired to postpone Austria's intervention until it would have the most impact, and therefore obtain the greatest advantages for Austria.

Metternich's opportunity arose in the summer of 1813 following the battles at Bautzen and Wurschen where Napoleon's forces defeated the allied forces and forced their retreat. Following these victories Napoleon undertook an action that he later concluded was one of his worst blunders when he agreed to an armistice at Poischwitz. Although both sides were exhausted and in need of reinforcements, Napoleon's enemies were in considerably worse condition than the French.³ The armistice allowed Russia and Prussia to obtain a subsidy treaty with England at Reichenbach on 15 June as well as securing Metternich as mediator.

Metternich had long hoped for a general peace that would establish an equilibrium in Europe, for it was the only way for Austria to secure its national interests. In the Treaty of Reichenbach, Austria pledged to join the war against France if Napoleon refused to accept the following four conditions by 20 July: the dissolution of the Duchy of Warsaw; the enlargement of Prussia; the return of Illyria to Austria; the restoration of Hamburg and Luebeck as free cities. Metternich believed that these conditions were essential to establishing a balance of power on the European continent, and if Napoleon refused, the incompatibility of French aims with a system of equilibrium would have been demonstrated. Metternich's desire for a diplomatic restoration of the balance of power failed when the Congress

at Prague collapsed on 11 August 1813 and the next day Austria declared war on France.

The allied armies, supported by English subsidies, achieved a decisive victory over Napoleon at the Battle of Leipzig from 16-19 October 1813. Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig resulted in a new set of problems for Metternich and the equilibrium of Europe. Continued defeats suffered by France would gravely disturb Metternich's grand design for a balance of power on the continent and risk the replacing of French dominance with that of Russia. In an effort to save Saxony and Poland, Metternich succeeded in securing an allied peace proposal that would have allowed France to maintain its natural boundaries of the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. England did not support the "Frankfurt proposals," however, and had Napoleon accepted them he may have been able to dissolve the alliance. Napoleon did not believe, however, that the allies possessed the resolve necessary to continue their efforts, and as a result he postponed making a decision on the proposals.⁴

At the end of 1813, despite the military successes achieved by the alliance against Napoleon, the cohesiveness of the alliance was in jeopardy. Metternich desired a strong France to act as a counter to Russia, and although England also sought to restore an equilibrium on the continent, it would not support any French territorial gains beyond those of "ancient" France nor allow negotiation over

maritime rights. Prussia was willing to allow Alexander's grand design for Poland to occur provided that it was compensated with Saxony, but Austria was opposed to any expansion of Russia to the west as well as Prussian expansion into Germany. To prevent the breakup of the coalition against France, England's foreign minister Lord Castlereagh hurried to the continent to consult with the allies.

Castlereagh's success in maintaining the alliance was perhaps more attributable to the events that took place from January to March 1814 than to his diplomatic talents, but still his contribution cannot be overlooked. England's insular position from the continental problems placed it in the unique position to play the role of a power balancer among the allies. Additionally, since England's interest in establishing an equilibrium on the continent paralleled those of Austria, Metternich could now count on support to oppose Russian and Prussian designs on Poland and Saxony, although this required Metternich to support English goals regarding the areas of Luxemburg, Mainz and the Netherlands.

Although an accommodation with Austria was possible, achieving an agreement with Alexander of Russia was much more difficult since Russian designs on Poland, as well as Alexander's desire to place Bernadotte of Sweden on the throne of France were contrary to the interests of England. Fortunately the tide of the war temporarily shifted against

the allies when they were forced to divide themselves because of difficulties with supply and geography. The division of the allied effort allowed Napoleon to achieve victories at Champaubert, Montmirail, Chateau-Thierry and Vauchamps from 10-15 February and at Nangis and Montereau on 17-18 February. These victories worried Alexander enough that he was now more willing to reach a formal agreement with the allies to secure Napoleon's defeat.

On 9 March 1814 Castlereagh achieved his goal of a consolidating alliance when the allies signed the Treaty of Chaumont whereby each power promised to "...keep 150,000 men in active service during the present war, and they pledged themselves not to make peace except with common consent."⁵ This treaty served to hold the alliance together and ensure the defeat of Napoleon, however, the treaty went farther than previous diplomatic initiatives by achieving an agreement between the powers to protect Europe against every attempt which France might make "...to infringe the order of things resulting from such pacification..." that might arise for the next twenty years.⁶ Although this treaty ensured the eventual military defeat of France, it did not address the general settlement of reconquered territories following the allied victory. This limitation, however, should not diminish the significance of the treaty as it laid the groundwork for the formation of the Concert of Europe.

B. THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA: A RETURN TO STABILITY

Following the abdication of Napoleon on 11 April and the signing of the First Treaty of Paris on 30 May, the victorious allies decided to hold a congress at Vienna to resolve the territorial issues that arose from the newly liberated areas. The settlement that emerged from the Congress of Vienna has often been said to have rested on three principles: compensation for the victors, legitimacy, and the balance of power. These principles played an important role in ensuring the peace in Europe, but they were not the only factors at work.

The triumph of conservatism over revolutionary liberalism resulted in a return to the commonality of outlook amongst the ruling elites of Europe. The widely divergent ideological views that characterized the French revolutionary period were dramatically reduced. Additionally, although the leading statesmen of Europe were still concerned with protecting their countries' interests, they all realized that their countries could only benefit through stability in Europe. Even England's Lord Castlereagh possessed Europeanist views, and although not as strong as that of Metternich, they were still significantly different from those of traditional English isolationists. The commonality of outlook and the internationalist perspective of the statesmen at the Congress of Vienna was expressed in the Quadruple Alliance signed on 20 November 1815.

The Quadruple Alliance, built upon the principles established in the Treaty of Chaumont, reflected the internationalist perspective of Europe's leading statesmen. Not only did the treaty guard against a resurgent France, but at the insistence of Lord Castlereagh, the representatives of the signatory powers of Russia, Prussia, Austria and England agreed to meet periodically to discuss common interests and problems. Besides reflecting the desire of the major powers to cooperate on mutual concerns and interests, the treaty also showed concern for Europe's minor states. According to Castlereagh, the treaty was intended "...not only as a systematic pledge of persevering concert amongst the leading Powers, but a refuge under which all the minor States, especially those on the Rhine, may look forward to find their security upon the return of peace relieved of the necessity of seeking a compromise with France."⁷

The Quadruple Alliance modified the traditional balance of power system that had evolved during the eighteenth century. The system that had been based on calculations of material power now also relied upon a new ideological harmony of self-conscious conservatism to assure the peace.⁸ Liberalism would be opposed before it could lead to a change in the material position of the European powers. Although this was originally conceived as a means to oppose any resurgence of liberalism in France, it was soon expanded

to support opposition to liberalism wherever it occurred in Europe. It is interesting to note that one of the chief proponents of this conceptualization was Lord Castlereagh who drafted Article VI of the Treaty which called for the periodic Congresses "...for the consideration of the measures which shall be considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of nations...and the peace of Europe."⁹ This type of policy was clearly contradictory of English traditions and liberalism that generally prevented interference in the domestic affairs of other states as well as avoiding continental complications, and demonstrated the ideological difference that existed between the English Cabinet and Castlereagh. According to Kissinger, England only approved the treaty because its implications were beyond the imagination of the members of the Cabinet.¹⁰ The differences that existed between Castlereagh and the English Cabinet would later serve to weaken the Congress system.

In addition to a return to a relatively heterogeneous ideology amongst the ruling elites of Europe, the statesmen at the Congress of Vienna suppressed the emergence of nationalism in Central Europe. The dream of a united Germany found no favor among the decision makers at Vienna. Although the Vienna Congress resulted in the establishment of 39 independent German states, a considerable consolidation from the over 300 political units that

constituted Germany before the French Revolution,¹¹ this increased centralization was the result of the desire to prevent the small principalities from gravitating into the French orbit and creating instability in Central Europe. Similarly, the politically disunited Italian peninsula, which Metternich alluded to as merely "a geographical expression", was left divided by the peacemakers. This arrangement, coupled with the powerful position of Austria on the peninsula, was deemed necessary to remove the likelihood of any future attempt by France to interfere on the peninsula.¹²

The combination of legitimacy, ideological similarity and suppressed nationalism resulted in a restoration of elite stability throughout Europe. This stability was further reinforced by the concepts embedded in the Quadruple Alliance regarding intervention to halt threats to the peace - this meant that the princes and rulers of both the great and lesser powers could once again feel secure from both domestic and foreign threats. This contributed significantly to the stability in Europe following the Napoleonic Wars.

C. THE FUNCTIONING CONCERT

The harmony that existed among the allies following the Congress of Vienna and the Second Paris Peace Treaty did not last long in its purest form. At the first post war meeting

between the powers, the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, which lasted from September to November 1818, the sovereigns and ministers met to bring a formal end to the military occupation of France, settle debts, and re-admit France to the group of great powers. Despite the fact that the Congress accomplished much useful work, it also marked the beginning of a rift between the liberal democratic power of England and the autocratic power of Russia, while Metternich of Austria attempted to mediate between the two.

The rift that developed between England and Russia was mainly the result of the differences that existed in the structures of society and government of the two powers. Although in the period immediately following the Napoleonic Wars, England entered into a period of conservatism as evidenced by such reactionary measures as the prohibition of public meetings and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus following the murder of a gunsmith proprietor in November 1816 at Spa Fields,¹² the fundamental structure of English institutions were still liberal, and this significantly limited the range of options available to English statesmen. Alexander of Russia faced no such constraints from the autocratic structure of Russian society, and therefore he was relatively unlimited in his policy options.

Alexander's relative freedom from domestic constraints in international affairs was demonstrated at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle when he proposed a new Alliance Solidaire

that was designed to strengthen the Holy Alliance and would have guaranteed not only each powers territories and possessions, but the existing form of government that had been established. This proposal would have established a tight organization of Europe and would have permitted a virtually unlimited right of intervention by the powers in the internal affairs of others.¹³ Alexander's scheme was dismissed brusquely by Castlereagh, whose policies had already been attacked in Parliament for their leniency towards Russia. Additionally, Canning, as well as other members of the Cabinet, were already raising objections to England's entanglements in continental affairs.¹⁴

Castlereagh's opposition to Alexander's proposal was supported by Metternich but for different reasons. Although Metternich was not opposed in principle to a scheme that guaranteed the existing order, he had no intention of allowing Russia a voice in every European concern or of making Austria's policy dependent on Alexander's consent. Still, Metternich desired to keep his Russian options open and ensure England's continued involvement on the continent, and therefore he persuaded the Tsar that his proposal was unnecessary because the Holy Alliance ensured that the various governments of Europe were guided by common principles. Metternich's logic was successful in inducing Alexander to withdraw his proposal and to avert a potentially decisive break in relations between England and Russia.¹⁵

The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, despite its success in concluding the occupation of France and re-integrating it back into the European system through the Quintuple Alliance in 1818, demonstrated the fundamental differences that existed amongst the allies. England moved back towards a more traditional isolationist policy and made it clear that England would only become involved on the continent to prevent the recurrence of French aggression or in times of great emergency. The continental powers of Russia and Austria, however, were much more concerned with preventing conflicts from occurring. The Central Powers did not enjoy the internal and external security that England had obtained as an island and therefore they favored intervention to maintain the status quo. It is in some ways a historical curiosity, although not at all surprising, that the country that produced the statesman who so stridently advocated the formation of a Congress system also was the country that in effect eventually doomed the conference system, a pattern that would be repeated by the United States after World War I.

The drift away from continental entanglements by England, although temporarily causing concern to Metternich, who had relied on England's support to counter Russia's increased influence in Eastern Europe, also served to unite the Central Powers as Metternich realized that cooperation with Russia would be necessary in the absence of England.

Metternich's need for a reconciliation with Russia was further demonstrated when Alexander opposed the Carlsbad Decree of 1819 that was supported by Austria and Prussia. The Decree was designed to suppress liberal political movements that had emerged in the German states, but Alexander was unwilling to allow Austria to intervene in Germany in order to prevent increased Austrian influence in Germany. Additionally, Alexander's brother-in-law was the King of Wuerttemberg, one of the rulers who had granted a liberal constitution that the Carlsbad Decree sought to overturn. In a show of support for his brother-in-law, in the fall of 1819 Alexander massed troops in Poland as a threat to Vienna.¹⁶ Conflict was only avoided by the astute diplomacy of Castlereagh. Although Castlereagh could not openly support Austria's and Prussia's interference in the domestic affairs of other states, he did voice his approval when he stated: "We are always glad to see evil germs destroyed without the power to give our approval openly."¹⁷ Castlereagh was able, however, to turn the necessity of remaining divorced from entanglements on the continent into a virtue when he was able to persuade Alexander that the Carlsbad Decree was only a legitimate effort to insure domestic tranquility, and no intervention by the other powers was necessary. Castlereagh made it clear that he expected the Russians to exercise the same restraint that England had, and thus the limited

Anglo-Austro cooperation was able to frustrate Russian intervention.

Despite the success that Metternich obtained in containing Russian expansion into the affairs of Central Europe, Metternich realized that this was only possible because Austria was strong enough to reverse the revolutionary changes taking place in Germany, and England through inaction was effective in supporting Metternich's goals. However, if the conflict had been larger, English inaction could have resulted in Austria and Russia becoming involved in conflict over Central Europe. It was this possibility that made Metternich realize that an eventual accommodation with Russia was necessary. The social upheavals that occurred in 1820 and 1821 further demonstrated Austria's need for cooperation with Russia.

D. THE RISE OF CONSERVATIVE SOLIDARITY IN THE EAST

From 1820 to 1821, four revolutions broke out in Europe - in Spain (1820), Naples (1820), Portugal (1820), and Piedmont (1821). Alexander, who had previously demonstrated his willingness to accept liberal reforms when they were introduced as in Germany by the legitimate ruler of the state, now displayed his unwillingness to allow liberal reforms to be forced upon a ruler by revolution or the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people. Metternich, by contrast, was opposed to liberalism as a matter of principle regardless of how it became embedded in society.

The revolution in Spain began on 1 January when unpaid troops mutinied at Cadiz, and in March the partisans of the Constitution of 1812 seized power in Madrid. Alexander wanted allied intervention to restore order,¹⁸ but Metternich was concerned over maintaining the balance of power should Russian troops march across Europe. England was also concerned with Russian intervention, and as a result the English Cabinet issued their State Paper of 5 May 1820 which stated that the alliance was "...never intended as a union for the government of the world or for the superintendence of the internal affairs of other States....No country having a representative system of Government could act upon [such a general principle]....We shall be found in our place when actual danger menaces the system of Europe: but this country cannot and will not act upon abstract and speculative principles of precaution. The Alliance which exists had no such purpose in view in its original formation."¹⁹ This paper rejected collective intervention unless a direct military danger was imminent, and although this ran contrary to Metternich's general doctrine, Metternich acquiesced to isolate Russia.

Although Metternich was able to overlook the situation in Spain, and the combination of Austria and England was able to diplomatically restrain Alexander, the uprising in Naples in July 1820 produced a direct challenge to Austrian control in Italy. Alexander, appalled by the liberal

risings called for a formal conference to discuss the revolutionary problems. This provided a difficult dilemma for Metternich because he could not idly sit back and watch conditions deteriorate in Italy as he had in Spain. Additionally, failure by Austria to act could result in Russian intervention alone. Finally, England supported intervention to restore order, but since the uprisings mainly affected Austria, it only supported intervention by Austria, both as a means of forestalling Russian advances as well as a means of saving England from having to reverse the policy it had announced during the Spanish crises. In an attempt to reach a compromise agreement, Metternich agreed to a congress of sovereigns at Troppau, although England agreed to only send its ambassador at Venice as an observer.

The Congress at Troppau convened on 23 October 1820 and was essentially a meeting of the three eastern powers of Austria, Prussia and Russia and marked the beginning of the cleavage between the conservative powers and England, which was later joined by France. Metternich dominated the conference, but to obtain Alexander's consent to restore order in Naples, Metternich had to agree that the intervention would be in the name of the Alliance. This requirement resulted in the "preliminary protocol" of 19 November which proclaimed: "States which have undergone a change of government, due to revolution, the results of which threaten other states, ipso facto cease to be members

of the European Alliance, and remain excluded from it until their situation gives guarantee for legal order and stability. If, owing to such alterations, immediate danger threaten other states, the powers bind themselves, by peaceful means, or if need be by arms, to bring back the guilty state into the bosom of the Great Alliance."²⁰

After completion of the preliminary protocol, it was agreed that another congress should be held at Laibach in January.

The Congress at Laibach convened on 12 January 1821 and resulted in the formal empowerment of Austria to put down the revolution in Italy. The preliminary protocol reached between the three conservative powers at Troppau, however, was opposed by England and France, not because they supported the revolutionary movements, but because they opposed the principle that the agreement was based upon. The English government issued a public protest on 19 January 1821, and stated that His Majesty's Government would "...never consent to charge itself as a member of the Alliance with the moral responsibility of administering a general European policy of this description."²¹ By the time of the protest, however, eighty thousand Austrian troops had marched into Northern Italy and ninety thousand Russian troops had crossed over into Europe to back up the Austrian actions.

Despite the English opposition to the "preliminary protocol", the English were relieved that only Austria, and

not the Russians or French were authorized to act in Italy. English support for Austria's actions was demonstrated by Castlereagh when he remarked to Metternich that "...you would have done better to have acted first and talked afterwards."²² Thus Metternich's skillful diplomacy had once again been able to prevent Russian expansion into Europe, and although England had now effectively withdrawn from the alliance, this was mainly because of procedural disputes rather than to opposition of the alliance goals.

Although the Congress at Laibach firmly established Metternich's position as the leading statesmen of Europe, during the conference an issue arose that would later break the solidarity of the conservative eastern powers. In March 1821 a Greek uprising in Moldavia occurred against Ottoman rule. The uprising placed Alexander in a difficult position because had he supported the Greek revolutionaries, he may have been able to gain influence in Turkey and secure Russian access to the Mediterranean, a long cherished goal. Supporting the Greeks, however, would have meant violating the principle that Alexander had espoused regarding the overthrow of legitimate governments by revolutionaries. Under strong pressure by Metternich, who realized that any expansion of Russian political influence to the Mediterranean would jeopardize English maritime interests and could lead to conflict, Alexander finally denounced the revolution, and dismissed his Greek foreign minister who had been supportive of the Greek uprising.

By the time the Congress at Laibach ended on 12 May 1821, Metternich had skillfully employed the doctrine of intervention to ensure the defeat of two revolutionary movements and further solidified Austria's position in Italy. Additionally, by using the conservative doctrine to limit Russian support for the Greeks, Metternich had ensured that Russian and English interests would not lead to conflict in the Balkans. Although Metternich had now achieved his goals in Italy, the revolution in Spain was still unresolved. Alexander still wanted to intervene, or as a minimum to authorize the French to intervene to reverse the revolution. Metternich avoided any commitment to action in Spain in order not to force England into opposition, although at the final declarations at Laibach the eastern powers restated their commitment in principle to the doctrine of Troppau. And, finally, these powers also agreed to participate in another conference the next year to discuss progress in Italy and review the situation in Spain and Portugal.

The final full gathering of the European concert of powers occurred at Verona in October 1822. The revolution in Spain was still a source of concern to Metternich, who realized that England's support against Russian intervention would be necessary to thwart Alexander's intentions. The likelihood of England's support was greatly diminished however when Castlereagh, who had planned to attend the

conference in person, ended his life on 12 August. Castlereagh was not replaced until five weeks later by George Canning, and the Duke of Wellington was named to take Castlereagh's position at Verona in the interim. Canning's appointment had a profound affect on the alliance. Although he was politically experienced and well informed in foreign affairs, he did not posses the European outlook of Castlereagh but instead favored the traditional English isolationist role. As England's support for involvement on the continent declined, Metternich was gradually forced to give in to the demands of Alexander for action in Spain, and as a result Austria ended up supporting French intervention on the Iberian peninsula.²³ Although England's active participation in the alliance had already ended, the French intervention in Spain caused England to openly break with the alliance. Canning perhaps best summed up the English attitude toward foreign affairs after the Congress at Verona when he remarked "For Alliance, read England, and you have the clue to my policy. Every country for itself and God for us all."²⁴

Although England had now essentially returned to its insular position, English interests on the continent still required England to periodically assume an active role to safeguard its interests. The greatest danger to England's interest would have been the emergence of a Franco-Russo alliance which would have dominated the continent.

Fortunately for England, the necessity of English diplomatic maneuvering to prevent a Franco-Russo rapprochement had been substantially reduced by the congresses of Troppau, Laibach and Verona which effectively transferred Austria's dependence from England to Russia. Austria had now assumed the role of maintaining the balance of power on the continent. It did so by deterring French attempts at hegemony with the Austro-Russo entente and preventing Russian expansion through the skillful diplomacy of Metternich. Despite Austria's mediating role, however, England still remained engaged on the continent. In April of 1823, when 100,000 French soldiers crossed the Pyrenees to suppress the Spanish revolt, Canning intervened diplomatically to ensure that the French occupation was only temporary, that the territorial integrity of Portugal would be respected, and that France would make no attempt to recover the rebel Spanish colonies.²⁵ Despite the relative success of the English diplomatic efforts, the Spanish crises revealed the weakness of England's insular position. Without the support of another power England was virtually powerless to halt the actions of one of the great powers, and thus Canning realized England would have to cooperate with the conservative eastern powers where their interests clashed with those of England rather than oppose them.

E. THE NEAR EAST HOLDS THE CONCERT TOGETHER

England's cooperation with Russia was the result of the continued chaos in the Balkans between the Greeks and the Turks. The inability of the Turks to rapidly defeat the Greek uprising was a source of concern because both England and Russia were sympathetic to the Greek cause, albeit for different reasons. The English were sympathetic to the Greeks, who were assumed to be the heirs of ancient Greek civilization, and as a result they recognized the insurgent Greeks as belligerents in 1823, and in 1824 delivered the first of a series of English loans thereby making themselves the financiers of the revolution. Russia, by contrast, was sympathetic toward the Greeks because of common religious beliefs and the Russian position as protectors of Eastern Orthodoxy. The common concern by the English and Russians for the Greeks resulted in a conference of the powers at St. Petersburg in 1824 to discuss Alexander's plan for creating three autonomous Greek principalities.²⁶ The other powers were opposed to this policy as it was seen as an attempt to weaken Turkey and strengthen Russian influence by establishing client states. Metternich was adamantly opposed to any such plan, even after the Turkish Sultan's vassal Mehemet Ali, the ruler of Egypt, began to dispatch forces to Turkey. The failure of another conference at St. Petersburg in 1825 resulted in Russia cooperating directly with England.

The cooperation that developed between Russia and England in the Near East resulted in the Anglo-Russian Protocol of 4 April 1826. The Protocol called for the Greeks to remain a dependency of the Ottoman Empire and pay an annual tribute to the Porte, in exchange for which the Greeks would enjoy complete liberty of conscience, freedom of commerce and exclusive conduct of their own internal government. Additionally, Article III left open the possibility of independent intervention by Russia although the terms of the arrangements specified in Article I were to be the basis for any reconciliation of the intervention.²⁷

The Anglo-Russian Protocol formed the basis for the Treaty of London signed on 6 July 1827 by the English, French and Russian governments. The French had become involved in the Near East affair mainly because it saw the possibility of intervention in Greece as a means to demonstrate their recovery in the Mediterranean as well as maintaining good relations with Russia in hope of breaking free of the constraints imposed upon the European powers. The three powers attempted to force an armistice on the Ottoman Empire and implement the Anglo-Russian Protocol by enforcing a blockade of the Morea. However, on October 20, 1827 the allied fleets trapped the Turkish navy at the Bay of Navarino, and in the confusion fighting erupted and the Turkish fleet was destroyed. When word of the conflict at Navarino reached Constantinople, the Turks proclaimed a holy war against Russia.

The Russo-Turkish War commenced in April 1828, and although the strength of the Ottoman Empire had been in decline, it was not an easy victory for the Russian troops. By August of 1829, despite stiff resistance, the Russian armies had marched down the Balkan peninsula and laid seige to the city of Adrianople. Russian troops were now within striking distance of Constantinople and thus raised the possibility that Russia would conquer the city and destroy the empire. The French viewed the Russian military victories and possible territorial expansion as an opportunity to link the war in the Near East with the rivalries that existed between the powers in Europe. Just before the signing of the Treaty of Adrianople on 14 September 1829, the French prime minister Polignac proposed to the Russians a plan for territorial revision that would have granted Russia extensive territorial gains in Turkey in exchange for French gains at the expense of the united Netherlands. Despite Russia's military conquests however, Nicholas was in no position to support a proposal that would have destroyed the agreements reached at Vienna.²⁸ Additionally, continued Russian presence in the Near East would have resulted in strong opposition from England and Austria, and therefore Nicholas did not support the French proposal.

Although the French proposal had been rejected by Russia, the French diplomatic initiatives demonstrated that

France was no longer content with the provisions of the agreements reached at Vienna. The French desire to assume a greater role in European politics and break free from the constraints placed on it by the other great powers was further demonstrated when, on the pretext of suppressing piracy in the western Mediterranean, the French bombarded and occupied Algiers.²⁹ The renewed aggressiveness of French foreign policy caused alarm. Fears of French imperialism re-emerged, particularly in England where French actions were seen as a direct threat to English naval supremacy. The remaining powers were not overly concerned, however, because the center of the European continent remained relatively stable. This condition changed dramatically however when revolution once again swept through France in July of 1830.

F. REVOLUTION RETURNS IN FRANCE

The revolution in France resulted in the replacement of Charles X with the Duke of Orleans, Louis Philippe, and once again raised the possibility of revolution and war in Europe. The revolution presented another set of challenges to both England and the eastern autocratic powers. Although all the powers were concerned with the possibility of renewed French aggression, Metternich was fearful that any joint allied intervention would result in Russian armies marching into Europe. Similarly, Prussia had no desire to

see its lands turned into a battlefield, and therefore Frederick William III was cautious not to advocate an aggressive response. Finally, England was in the midst of liberal reform as the Tory government came under increasing attack as an aristocratic system. When demands for liberal domestic reforms increased, some of this liberal sentiment spilled over into foreign policy. As a result England became relatively more sympathetic to the French cause, although to state that it fully supported France would be untrue. Only Nicholas of Russia desired to take dramatic action, but without the support of the other powers, he could accomplish little unilaterally. The combination of these circumstances resulted in Metternich, in consultation with Nesselrode of Russia, issuing the "Chiffon of Carlsbad" whereby the two governments agreed not to intervene in French internal affairs unless France inaugurated an active policy abroad.³⁰

In an effort to preserve the peace, England recognized Louis Philippe as the legitimate constitutional ruler of France and the Austrians and the Prussians quickly followed suit. The Austrians hoped that by recognizing the new king that France would recognize Austria's dominant position in Italy while Prussia hoped to ensure peace on the Rhine.³¹ Nicholas of Russia, however, did not adopt the conciliatory attitude of the other powers but instead undertook significant measures against the revolutionary movement.

Although these were largely ineffective without the cooperation of the other powers, Nicholas' actions significantly undermined the Franco-Russian relationship established during the crises in the Near East.

The fall of the Bourbon monarchy in France increased the pressure for reforms in England with the revolution being warmly received by the Whigs and radicals. In November 1830, the Tory government was replaced by a Whig government committed to parliamentary reform. Although England was still concerned with containing France within its 1815 borders, Metternich and many other European conservatives viewed the English reforms as an onslaught on the established order. Liberal politicians were quick to point out that the great powers were now aligned into two rival groups: an eastern autocratic alignment and a western liberal entente.

The formation of two rival groups, although in some ways correct, was really illusory. England was able to exploit French fears of isolation and encirclement to render France subservient to England's interest, while in the east Austria and Prussia were hostage to their perception of Russian might. Additionally, since England, Austria and Prussia were always guarding against possible Russian expansion, they still shared mutual interests. Finally, England, Austria, Prussia and Russia still feared French aggression and therefore shared common interests as well. Thus,

although it is true that both England and France felt compelled to resist absolutism, the commonality of interests among the victors of Waterloo dominated over any ideological groupings that they may have been placed into.

Perhaps the most important factor that determined European relations after 1830 and divided Europe into two opposing camps was the events in the Near East. In late 1831 Mehemet Ali, the pasha of Egypt, sought to extend his control over Palestine, Syria and Arabia. The Egyptian forces were opposed by the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II, however, by December of 1832 the Egyptian forces had won a series of victories and were threatening to overrun Asia Minor and take Constantinople itself. Austria promoted collective action by the powers to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but when discussions between Austria and England bogged down, the Sultan requested aid from Russia. The Russian intervention in February 1833 saved the Ottoman Empire, but prior to the Russian withdrawal the tsar concluded a treaty at Unkiar Skelessi on 8 July 1833.³² The treaty gave Russia expanded influence in the Ottoman Empire, a serious blow to England's interest.

The Russian diplomatic victory also increased England's suspicions of Austria's policy as Palmerston believed, although probably incorrectly, that Metternich was privy to Russian intentions and had deliberately misled England. England's suspicion increased however when Nicholas and the

Austrian Emperor Francis and Metternich met at Muenchengraetz and concluded a formal alliance that recognized the right of any sovereign to summon the aid of the eastern powers if threatened by revolution.

The solidarity of the eastern powers to put down the liberal movement all over Europe was a concern to the liberal English ministry as well as France. To counter the conservative eastern powers, England, France, Portugal and Spain established a quadruple alliance in 1834. The alliance, although formed to safeguard the Portuguese and Spanish queens from the reactionary pretenders Dom Miguel and Don Carlos respectively, became an effective counterbalance to the eastern powers. According to Palmerston the treaty established "...a quadruple alliance among the constitutional states of the West, which will serve as a powerful counterpoise to the Holy Alliance of the East."³³ Although liberals throughout Europe viewed the treaty as an organization against autocratic power, the ideological differences that existed were still subordinated to geographical interests, particularly in the Near East.

G. THE RETURN OF THE EASTERN QUESTION

The conflict of interests that resulted in the Near Eastern Crises of 1839-41 demonstrated the relative unimportance of ideological views amongst the powers. Palmerston believed that Turkey should undergo an extensive

program of reform to revitalize and transform it into a modern state able to look after its own interests and be released from its dependence on Russia. Additionally, England was opposed to any Egyptian expansion into Turkey. Russia, although it shared no desire to strengthen Turkey, also opposed Egyptian expansion. The desire to halt Egyptian expansion therefore provided a common interest between Russia and England in the Near East.

Although England and France shared elements of a common ideology, French policies in the Near East diverged from those of England. Throughout the 1830s, following the French move into Algiers, France had pursued a policy of expansion in North Africa, and by the late 1830s French policy in the Mediterranean was decidedly anti-English. The French believed additionally that a close relationship with Egypt was an integral part of their Mediterranean policy. Thus when conflict broke out between Turkey and Egypt in June 1839, France was supportive of Egypt while Russia and England supported Turkey.

The Egyptians quickly inflicted heavy losses on the Turkish forces at Nazib, and when combined with the death of the Sultan Mahmud II, Turkey was in a state of panic. Metternich seized the opportunity to regain the diplomatic initiative, and through discussions with the great power ambassadors in Vienna, he was able to issue a collective note on 27 July that informed the sultan that the powers

were preparing to intervene. Nicholas had not approved of the action although he did not reject it because he realized that any unilateral action by Russia could result in war with England. Additionally, Anglo-Russo cooperation presented an opportunity for Russia to separate the Anglo-French entente, thereby isolating France, the country that Nicholas considered the breeding ground of revolution in Europe.³⁴

France's support of Egypt, and its desire not to see Egypt deprived of its gains resulted in the isolation of France. France's isolation was shortlived, however, as the French began to threaten war against England and on the Rhine if the coercion of Egypt continued. Since Austria and Prussia would bear the brunt of any French aggression, Metternich used his influence to bring France back into the concert. Similarly, Louis Philippe also sought to end France's brief isolation, and as a result, the Thiers ministry was abandoned and a new ministry was formed. The change of government in France, combined with the submission of Mehemet Ali ended the crises, and the agreement concluded between the five powers in June 1841 regarding the straits effectively ended France's isolation.

H. SUMMARY

The international system that existed from 1815 to 1848 was a period characterized by general peace and stability

throughout Europe. Although the French Revolution and the resulting Napoleonic Wars had a tremendous influence on the statesmen of the period, the stability amongst the great powers of Europe was the result of many of the same factors that promoted stability in Europe during the eighteenth century.

The Congress of Vienna re-established the stability of the ruling elites of Europe that had been undermined by the French Revolution. Although the domestic order of Europe was no longer as highly structured, the fundamental principles underlying the dynastic order were restored. Compensating for the decline in the structure of European society, however, was the general guarantee by the great powers to protect both one another and the lesser powers from French expansionist desires. The eastern powers, additionally, were willing to go beyond merely protecting one another from French aggression and protect one another from domestic revolution as well. The combination of these guarantees produced a period of great elite stability throughout Europe.

The statesmen at Vienna also made the conscientious decision to avoid redrawing the map of Europe along nationalistic lines, thus suppressing any conflicts that may have developed along these lines, although only temporarily. Although refusing to accept the new force of nationalism as a guiding factor in European relations, the great powers,

nevertheless, were able to ensure a high degree of flexibility in the international system.

A third factor that the period from 1815 to 1848 had in common with the eighteenth century was the relative unimportance of ideology and the lack of widely divergent ideological views amongst the ruling elite. Although England was substantially more liberal than the remainder of Europe, and after 1830 there was much talk of an Anglo-French liberal alignment, the ideological differences between the powers were never important enough to undermine the general diplomatic relationships between the powers. Ideological differences never kept any of the powers from reaching agreements to preserve the peace or the balance of power as evidenced by the numerous rapprochements between the powers throughout this period.

A fourth factor was the return to an internationalist perspective amongst the ruling elites of Europe. The leaders of the great powers were now much more concerned with the maintenance of the balance of power on the continent, and even though the system of congresses had broken down by 1822, the statesmen of Europe still exhibited a high degree of awareness in international affairs.

Fifth, the system created at the Congress of Vienna, and great power action during this period prevented large scale conflicts from developing in the center of the European continent. The European powers not only took quick and

decisive action to stop revolutionary movements that may have threatened the peace on the continent, they were also careful to prevent large coalition actions from occurring on the continent. Limitating coalition actions was tremendously important in ensuring that great power rivalries would not erupt over conflicts of interests during joint actions.

The end product of these conditions, finally, was a return to a system that could once again be characterized as one of limited means and limited ends. None of the great powers was willing to embark upon a continental hegemonic drive for fear of opposition from the other powers, and all powers were careful to not endanger another's vital interests through unilateral action.

The moderate and limited nature of international diplomacy was once again altered, however, by the revolutions that swept through Europe in 1848. Although the level of violence would not approach that of the French Revolutionary period, the revolutions of 1848 significantly destabilized the international system.

¹Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 29.

²Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna/a study in Allied unity: 1812-1822, (New York: The Viking Press, 1968), 27.

³Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World, (New York: Collier Books, 1985), 137.

⁴Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), 101-3.

⁵Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830-1841, vol. 1, (London: G. Bell & Sons, Ltd., 1951), 277.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Charles Webster, The Congress of Vienna 1814-1815, (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1963), 51.

⁸Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics International Systems in Perspective, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), 56.

⁹Kissinger, A World Restored Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822, 186.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Gordon A. Craig, Europe Since 1815, alt. ed., (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), 18.

¹²Arthur J. May, The Age of Metternich 1814-1848, rev. ed., (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), 17.

¹³Frederick B. Artz, Reaction and Revolution 1814-1832, vol. 13 of The Rise of Modern Europe, ed. William L. Langer (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1934), 122.

¹⁴Barbara Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914, The Lippincott History Series, ed. Robert F. Byrnes, (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964), 46.

¹⁵Artz, Reaction and Revolution 1814-1832, 161.

¹⁶Kissinger, A World Restored Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822, 222-6.

¹⁷Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914, 49.

¹⁸Kissinger, A World Restored Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822, 245.

¹⁹Ibid., 249.

²⁰C. W. Crawley, "International Relations 1815-1830," War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval 1793-1830, ed. C. W. Crawley, vol. 9 of The New Cambridge Modern History, gen ed. J. P. T. Bury (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 675.

²¹Artz, Reaction and Revolution 1814-1832, 164-5.

²²Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna/a study in Allied unity: 1812-1822, 268.

²³Crawley, "International Relations 1815-1830," 677.

²⁴Kissinger, A World Restored Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822, 314-5.

²⁵Crawley, "International Relations 1815-1830," 680.

²⁶F. R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, The Great Powers and the European States System 1815-1914, (London: Longman Group Limited, 1980), 42.

²⁷Ibid., 45.

²⁸Matthew Smith Anderson, The Great Powers and the Near East 1774-1923, (London: Edward Arnold, 1970), 32.

²⁹Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830-1841, 277.

³⁰Bridge and Bullen, The Great Powers and the European States System 1815-1914, 47.

³¹Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914, 93.

³²Bridge and Bullen, The Great Powers and the European States System 1815-1914, 49.

³³Gordon Craig, "The System of Alliances and the Balance of Power," The Zenith of European Power 1830-1870, ed. J. P. T. Bury, vol. 10 of The New Cambridge Modern History, gen ed. J. P. T. Bury (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 251.

³⁴Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830-1841, 397.

³⁵Craig, "The System of Alliances and the Balance of Power," 256.

V. 1848: THE UNDERMINING OF THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

The liberal, democratic and nationalistic revolutions that swept across Europe in 1848, although shortlived as reactionary forces quickly reasserted themselves, nonetheless had a destabilizing and lasting effect upon the international system. Both liberal and conservative ideologies were undermined by the revolution, leading one historian to comment that the revolution "...brought about the end of the world. Being the practical application of an ideology that sprang from the French Revolution and the First Empire, it can be said, by its failure, to have exhausted that ideology. Thus it is an end rather than a beginning, for subsequent events were the fruit of different ideas."¹ While it is true that liberal and conservative ideologies were in some respects discredited, the revolutions of 1848 had another and more important and lasting consequence - the triumph of nationalism over liberalism and its subsequent destructive effects on the international system as it undermined the principles that had created stability in Europe during both the eighteenth century and the period from 1815 to 1848.

A. THE BACKGROUND CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTIONS

Although it is not necessary to examine in great detail the background causes of the revolutions, and the fact that each revolution had its own unique causes and was the product of each country's unique historical experience, all the revolutions were influenced by several general conditions that existed throughout Europe. The first common factor was the economic crises that resulted from the poor cereal harvests in 1845 and 1846. The ensuing food shortage contributed to the substantial rise in food prices throughout Europe, often times by over 50 percent, with complex affects on commercial, financial and industrial activity that was already suffering from a cyclical downswing. Besides the obvious effect that rising food prices had on the poor people in both town and country, as larger portions of income were spent by them on foodstuffs, expenditures on manufactured goods declined, resulting in the unemployment of both urban and rural industrial workers. The pre-industrial subsistence crises, when combined with the overproduction and underconsumption crises more typical of an industrial economy, were particularly difficult for ruling elites to deal with because Europe was in a transition from a rural and agricultural society to an urban and industrial one.

The economic crises created a second common factor, namely the intensification of social problems that had

developed as the result of industrialization and population growth. The expansion of these two areas, and the urbanization that accompanied them, resulted in a rise in social tensions that frequently produced strikes, demonstrations, increased criminality, and food riots such as the "potato revolt" in Berlin in 1847. As a result of these disturbances, the ruling elites were forced to deal with the problems of maintaining law and order. In addition to these pressing social problems, the governing elites were faced with demands from the rising middle class for concessions regarding censorship, widening of the electoral franchise and the establishment of representative assemblies. The middle class was the decisive group in the revolutionary process because it possessed the organizational capacity for mobilization of wider circles of both the bourgeoisie and the masses and could, therefore, politicize their discontent.

The economic and social problems produced a third common factor, namely a political crisis. The aristocratic ministers of the conservative elites feared that concessions would only open the flood gates to further demands as occurred in France during the French Revolution, and, therefore, the ruling elites sought to preserve the status quo. This reluctance to respond to pressure for change resulted in growing political polarization. The economic, social and political crises represents the background causes

to the revolutions of 1848. The effect that the revolutions of 1848 had on the international system must now be examined.

B. THE OUTBREAK AND SPREAD OF REVOLUTION ACROSS EUROPE

The first outbreak of revolution occurred in January 1848 in Palermo and was essentially a separatist movement against rule from Naples,² but its impact on the international system was minimal. Of decisive importance was the revolution that occurred in Paris in February of 1848. In view of the previously discussed economic, social and political crises, opposition leaders to the unpopular Guizot ministry sought to have him replaced by a cabinet that would adopt political and social reforms. The opposition had planned to hold demonstrations on 22 February 1848 near the Champs d' Elysées, but upon learning that the government had planned to have police disband the demonstrators, the leaders decided to cancel the demonstrations. Radical leaders and hard core activists Alexandre Ledru-Rollin and the poet Alphonse Louis-Marie de Lamartine, however, decided to continue with the demonstrations.

The radical demonstrators and police clashed on the morning of 22 February, and although fighting developed, it was only sporadic and the police were able to control the situation. On 23 February, however, the crowds were larger

and more aggressive, and the police could not adequately control the demonstrators. This resulted in the National Guard being ordered into action. Since the National Guard was comprised of a large number of the disenchanted and radical workers, however, the Guard was ineffective as it began to fraternize with the demonstrators. Faced with rising opposition Louis Philippe dismissed Guizot in the afternoon. Guizot's dismissal was too little too late, and on the evening of 23 February angry mobs and elements of the police force known as the Municipal Guard, clashed on the Boulevard des Capucines with 40 to 50 people being killed. Shortly thereafter the French citizens put up more than 1500 barricades on the Paris streets, and by the afternoon of 24 February a panicked Louis Philippe had abdicated and was in the process of fleeing the country. Despite the turmoil, Lamartine was able to declare a republic, establish a provisional government and install himself as foreign minister.³

When news of the events in France reached the capitals of Europe, fears of French aggression combined with the widespread social discontent that already existed to produce a period of tremendous elite insecurity and tension. The European monarchs responded by preparing for war. In Germany troops were mobilized. On 4 March 1848, Prussia ordered its armed forces to the Rhine and placed them on alert. Holland and Belgium increased their readiness along

the French border. On 11 March, Tsar Nicholas placed his armies on a state of alert.⁴

Meanwhile, in Vienna, Metternich embarked on an aggressive diplomatic campaign to concert ways of preventing France from once again flooding its neighbors with revolutionary propaganda. The bourgeoisie in Austria immediately became convinced that Metternich would launch a crusade resulting in heavy expenditures and inflation, and as a result there was a run on the banks in Vienna and other large cities.⁵ This financial panic added to the instabilities already present within the empire, and allowed Lajos Kossuth to attack the conservative ministry in a passionate speech to the Hungarian Diet on 3 March in which he demanded the "...transformation of our present system of government by committees into a responsible and independent Hungarian Ministry."⁶ Nationalism had now become an issue in the Habsburg Empire.

Pressure began to mount on France as the diplomacy of the eastern powers and their military mobilization resulted in the encirclement of France. In an attempt to prevent France from being opposed by a hostile Europe, Lamartine issued his Manifesto to Europe on 4 March 1848 in which he declared "...the treaties of 1815 have no legal existence in the eyes of the French republic; nevertheless the territorial provisions of these treaties are a fact which the republic admits as a basis and starting point in its

relations with other nations."⁷ With this declaration Lamartine had attempted to appease both the radical elements of French society by repudiating the treaties of 1815 yet acknowledging the existence of the balance of power system and territorial divisions reached at the Congress of Vienna.

Lamartine's declaration, although regarded by many as a call to war, did offer some diplomatic encouragement to England which still supported the policy of non-intervention in domestic affairs. The English foreign secretary Palmerston used the declaration to encourage the eastern powers to give France assurances that "...so long as France is not aggressive, no aggression will be made upon her."⁸ The powers thus had reacted to France in 1848 the same way that they had in 1830, and it was hoped that the restrained nature of their reaction would prevent a further radicalization of the revolution, and prevent what Metternich believed would be another attempt at French hegemony when he compared the events of 1848 to 1791 and asked "...can 1793 fail to follow?"⁹ The cautious response by the great powers to the events in France, and the delicate diplomacy conducted by Lamartine, prevented any contemplated intervention against France. The rapid success and relative ease with which the French were able to overthrow their government, however, helped to encourage the liberal and nationalistic elements throughout Europe to act against the already unstable conservative elites.

In Vienna a tense meeting of the Lower Austrian Diet took place on 13 March as a large crowd of disenchanted workers and radical students assembled to protest the current conditions. The subsequent events were similar to those of Paris. Troops were called in to clear the streets and restore order, but in the midst of the general malaise one detachment of troops opened fire and killed four people and wounded many others.¹⁰ It may have been possible for the Emperor Ferdinand to restore order had he been decisive and authorized Prince Alfred Windischgraetz to intervene militarily, but instead Ferdinand had a loss of will and submitted to the demands of the people that called for the withdrawal of troops, the arming of the students, and the resignation of Metternich.

The resignation of Metternich had devastating consequences for the remainder of Central Europe. In Venice the Austrian General Zichy rapidly capitulated to a group of insurgent workers and peasants. Zichy, unsure of his support from both Austria and from his Italian troops, believed his situation to be untenable. Zichy's surrender was followed by the establishment of a Venetian republic led by Daniel Manin on 17 March.¹¹ Once again the Austrian Empire was being threatened with dismemberment by a nationalist revolution.

On 18 March, inspired by the events in Paris and Vienna, a revolt against Austrian rule occurred in Milan when a

crowd of 10,000 petitioned for press freedom, citizens' militias and the election of a parliament. As in Paris and Vienna, clashes with troops followed and barricades were erected. The Austrian commander Radetzky was forced to retreat after five days of bitter street fighting to a fortified belt between Lake Como and the River Po known as the Quadrilateral.¹²

The revolutions in Austria, coupled with the Habsburg's difficulties in Italy, also had a significant impact on the situation in Prussia and the Germanic states. In Berlin a large crowd gathered at the royal palace to listen to a royal decree from the king Frederick William IV. Although the king firmly believed in his divine right to rule, the decree was moderately liberal in that it promised the abolition of press censorship, a constitution, convening of a united diet, and a Prussian leadership committed to work toward German unity. This last point had important ramifications for the future of the Vienna settlement. Prussia's goal of a united Germany represented a desire by one of the great powers to fundamentally alter the balance of power in Central Europe, and therefore Prussia's action represented the beginning of the breakdown of the Vienna system. Although the breakdown would not be completed for several years, the action illustrates an important point as Prussia became more inward looking and less concerned with maintaining the international system, a pattern that would

be repeated by the other powers during the revolutionary period and its aftermath.

Frederick William's decree may have been able to satisfy the masses, however, when soldiers were seen massed in the courtyard of the palace, a panic set in amongst the crowd, and calls for the removal of the army occurred. Frederick William, upon hearing the growing disenchantment, ordered his troops to clear the courtyard. Events similar to those in Paris and Vienna followed, and within a short time barricades were being resurrected and street fighting developed.¹³

The government could easily have put down the rebellion, in fact by the evening of 18 March many of the barricades had been destroyed by cannon fire and many of the insurgents arrested. In the outlying districts, however, resistance still flourished. The army recommended that the king abandon the city for his palace at Potsdam while the army blockaded and bombarded the city. This proposed action was too harsh for the monarch who had no desire to see the Berlin population repressed over what he considered the work of foreign agitators. On the morning of 19 March, Frederick William halted military operations and ordered the removal of troops from the city. For the next several days, a period known as the "Berlin Days," the king enacted a number of liberal reforms which seemed to complete the revolution.¹⁴

C. SOURCES OF INSTABILITY IN THE REVOLUTIONARY AFTERMATH

The events of late February and early March had resulted in the destruction of the alliance of the conservative eastern powers as well as the common internationalist outlook that had existed between them and helped to maintain the international system. Although there was brief talk of a formation of a new liberal alliance, particularly from Prussia which sought to liberate Poland,¹⁵ the lack of a common outlook amongst the liberal powers when coupled with their inability to overcome the limits of their preexisting diplomacy prevented a return to a stable international system. France, despite being strongly positioned to aid the revolutions in Northern Italy, continued to avoid an aggressive foreign policy as fears of hostile encirclement continued to influence the decisions of Lamartine and others. England, despite its liberal institutions, pursued a policy of restraining France due to its past experiences with French hegemony. Prussia sought not only the liberation of Poland, but also the unification of Germany under Prussian leadership. The leaders of the multi-ethnic Austrian Empire were more concerned with preventing the breakup of the empire by Hungarian, Italian and Czech separatists, and therefore their energies were mainly directed inward. The inability of the ruling elites to achieve an internationalist outlook as well as break free from their preexisting diplomatic tendencies resulted in

1848 becoming "a great moment tragically missed" for the liberals of Europe.

The lack of a common international perspective among the elites and their inability to overcome the restraints of the pre-existing diplomacy, particularly on the part of England and France, hindered a return to stability in Europe. The instability of the liberal elites following their rapid accession to power also produced instabilities in the international system. The instability of the elites was largely brought about by the increased political mobilization and financial disarray from the revolutions, coupled with the relatively narrow middle class goals of the revolutions. These factors contributed significantly to the resurgence of reactionary forces.

In France, the Provisional Government had established National Workshops to provide relief to the unemployed masses. Faced with a growing budget deficit, however, it was necessary for the government to raise money through tax revenues in order to pay the workers. The government was fearful that the imposition of a new tax on the wealthy bankers, creditors and manufacturers would endanger state and commercial credit, and jeopardize a return to financial prosperity that was deemed necessary to cure the social problems of France.¹⁶ As a result, the government ended up increasing direct taxation, mainly through a land tax, by 45 percent. This measure alienated the peasant class as the

French peasant viewed the Paris proletariat as "...the spendthrift who did himself well at his expense."¹⁷ This sentiment also extended to the middle class and property owners in France as they increasingly came to view the unemployed as lazy and worthless.

D. THE CONSERVATIVE REACTION

In view of these conditions it was not surprising that the elections to the National Assembly held in April 1848 resulted in a decisive victory for the moderate republicans led by Lamartine who advocated liberal political reforms but not radical social reforms. The republican victory increased the tensions in the workshops as the workers believed that social reforms would not be undertaken. This in turn raised fears that the workers would unite in a socialist revolution, and as a result discussions over dissolution of the workshops dominated the assembly. On 23 June the conservative catholic Comte de Falloux presented a decree to dissolve the workshops within three days and send the workers to either the army or the provinces. Falloux's plan had already been found out by the workers, and as a result, as the report was presented in the Assembly, the workers built barricades throughout the working class sections of Paris. The streetfighting that followed during the "June Days" (23-26 June 1848) resulted in the defeat of the workers by the government forces led by General Louis

Cavaignac after the bloodiest street fighting seen in Europe. The intense violence made many middle class people fearful of some of the liberal changes and led to a reaction against many of the liberal reforms. In the aftermath of the violence legislation was enacted to suppress radical clubs and newspapers, and Cavaignac was given dictatorial powers until a new constitution and elections could be held.¹⁸ It was these events that allowed Louis Napoleon Bonaparte III to be elected president on 10 November 1848, and eventually led to Bonaparte achieving dictatorial powers through democratic procedures such as the plebiscite.

In Prussia, the National Assembly that had been elected in May 1848 became involved in extensive debates between the liberals who desired merely to obtain classic liberal concessions such as increased political influence based on manhood suffrage, and the radicals, who advocated stronger social change. The radicals in the Prussian parliament frustrated the liberal ministry of Ludolf Camphausen, although those who advocated social change never obtained enough power to legislate changes. The inability of the radicals to effect change resulted in the formation of numerous clubs, and as economic conditions deteriorated, tensions inside Berlin increased. On 14 June 1848, a clash occurred between the Civic Guard and workers when the workers seized arms from an armory. Although the violence that followed does not compare with that of France during

the June Days, the majority of the people feared social upheaval, and thus opposed violence and disorder.¹⁹ Shortly after the uprising, Camphausen resigned, and Frederick William began to restore his authority. In September the troops that the monarch had ordered withdrawn from Berlin at the start of the revolution returned, and on 5 December 1848, the assembly was dissolved and a constitution promulgated by royal decree. The constitution decreed by Frederick William made significant liberal concessions,²⁰ and illustrates an important outcome of the revolutions of 1848. The adoption of liberal principles by conservative reactionaries, even though only in a limited manner, served to undermine the legitimacy of conservative rule throughout Europe and helped to contribute to the breakdown in cooperation between the conservative powers in the aftermath of the revolution.

The collapse of the revolution in Prussia had significant implications for the remainder of Germany, particularly in Frankfurt where representatives of the Germanic states were drafting a constitution for a united German Empire. In January of 1849, the new liberal constitution for a united Germany had passed its first reading in the Parliament, and on 28 March the imperial crown was offered to Frederick William by a vote of 290 to 248.²¹ Frederick William refused the crown because although he possessed nationalist feelings toward German

unification, the crown was not given to him by the grace of God but by the grace of "...master bakers and butchers."²² His refusal of the crown meant that the initiative for a new political framework for Germany passed to the individual states, of which Austria and Prussia were dominant. Since Prussia had already recovered from the revolution, and its king had already demonstrated his interest in German unification under Prussian leadership, Prussia assumed the lead in moving towards German unification.

Before Prussia could attempt to unite German states, however, the liberal revolutionaries in Germany who still supported the Frankfurt constitution had to be defeated. Frederick promised military support to any German prince who required assistance. As a result, Prussian troops marched into the Rhineland city of Elberfeld, the Bavarian Palatinate, Baden and Dresden and defeated the revolutionaries.²³ Order had been restored in Germany.

With order restored in Germany, Frederick William sought to achieve German unity through his own designs. Prussia's German policy was formulated by General Joseph Maria von Radowitz, who conceptualized a German confederation with the king of Prussia as its head. The emperor would be assisted by a college of six princes and a two-chamber parliament, but the Prussian king would have absolute veto power on all legislation. This new German Empire would then be joined to the Habsburg monarchy which would be under Austrian

leadership. This larger federation would be governed by a directory of four, of which two members would be Austrian. This program was rejected by the Austrian Prince Felix von Schwarzenberg, however, because a German empire under Prussian leadership significantly altered the balance of power in central Europe. Despite these objections, Prussia implemented portions of its plan on 26 May 1849 when a draft constitution for the German Confederation was accepted by Prussia, Hanover and Saxony, as well as twenty-six lesser German states. Although this was unacceptable to Austria, the ongoing struggle against revolutionary forces in its own empire, prevented Austria from opposing Prussia's diplomatic advances in Germany. Once the revolutions were defeated, however, Austria assumed a diplomatic offensive in Germany to thwart Prussian designs.²⁴

The triumph of reactionary forces in the Austrian Empire, although taking longer than the French and Prussian reactions because of the nationalist revolutionary movements in Bohemia, Hungary and Italy, was still successful and followed a similar sequence of events. First, a breakdown in unity amongst the revolutionaries occurred as large scale political mobilization resulted in increased demands upon the government that it was unable to meet. Second, class conflict emerged between workers, who demanded social reforms, and the middle class, who sought political reform. When the working class began to represent a threat to the

propertied middle class, the middle class became increasingly alienated from the revolution. Third, as the financial crises that helped to precipitate the crises worsened during the revolution, the revolutionary leaders realized that the restoration of order was necessary to bring about prosperity. The need to restore order resulted in the revolutionaries relying more and more on the conservative bureaucracies and armies, thereby allowing reactionary forces to reassert themselves, often using the force of nationalism to promote their cause.

In Vienna, the high point of the revolution was marked by the flight of the Emperor Ferdinand and his family to Innsbruck on 17 May 1848. Ferdinand's flight, however, produced another heavy run on the banks and created additional economic chaos in Vienna. What remained of the government attempted to preserve security and order, but attempts to dissolve the armed students that formed the Academic Legion resulted in another spate of barricade building. The students were joined by the workers, and as a result the government felt compelled to grant additional concessions, including the formation of a new Committee of Security on 25 May.²⁵ The Committee of Security essentially controlled Vienna for the next several months.

The Committee of Security attempted to alleviate the economic and social crises by adopting measures to provide work or maintenance for the unemployed. As in Paris, this

measure resulted in large numbers of unemployed workers converging on the city from the outlying provinces, and increased the threat of further social disorder. The middle class became alarmed at the prospects of social revolution as they had no desire to see the economic order overthrown, while the peasants were merely concerned with securing the abolishment of their servitude.²⁶

Besides the increased divisions among the various economic classes, divisions also began to develop among the nationalist groupings in the empire. At the first Pan-Slav Congress that convened in early June at Prague, the Czech nationalist Francis Palacky called for the conversion of the Habsburg empire into "...a federation of nations all enjoying equal rights."²⁷ This led to clashes between Czechs and Germans, and the heightened nationalist passions resulted in a series of violent demonstrations as barricades were erected throughout the city. During a demonstration on 12 June 1848 the wife of Prince Alfred Windischgraetz, the commander of the armed forces at Prague, was accidentally shot and killed. The death of his wife, coupled with the increased chaos in the city, resulted in Windischgraetz bringing in military reinforcements, and on 17 June bombarding Prague. Shortly thereafter the revolutionary movement in Bohemia was crushed, and a military dictatorship was established.

The defeat of the revolutionaries at Prague was followed by similar victories by Austrian forces in Italy. Radetzky's forces inflicted a crushing defeat on the Piedmontese at Custozza from 23-25 July, and on 8 August he entered Milan in triumph. On 9 August, Charles Albert signed an armistice in which Piedmont pledged itself to no longer support Lombardy-Venetia. The conservative victories were strongly appreciated by a large number of Austro-Germans who had "...come to see the point of view that the Italian insurgents must be crushed not only for the sake of the Habsburg empire, but for the sake of all Germany as well."²⁸ Heightened nationalism was becoming a driving force in the multi-ethnic Habsburg empire.

By the summer of 1848, nationalism had become an important force in determining the outcome of the revolution. The Czechs, Hungarians, Italians, as well as the Poles, aspired to destroy the dominant position the Germans held in the empire while the Croats, Slovenes, Serbs and Slovaks struggled to break free from the domination of the Magyars. It was these nationalist divisions that the conservative forces were able to exploit to their own advantage to help turn back the revolutions of 1848.

In September of 1848, the Austrian court restored Josef Jellachich as the governor of Croatia and sanctioned his invasion of Hungary as a means to help defeat the Hungarian separatist movement.²⁹ The Hungarians were able to drive Jellachich's forces out of Hungary on 3 October, however,

and they then launched a counter-invasion of Austria. On 6 October, a German regiment was dispatched from Vienna by German nationalists within the government to reinforce Jellachich. This led many of the radicals to take to the streets to offer resistance, and angry crowds marched on the Ministry of War building. One of the radicals then murdered the war minister Count Theodor von Latour. On October 7 the Austrian court fled to Olmutz,³⁰ but the violence of October had turned many of the middle class against the revolution.

With Vienna in disarray, it may have been possible for the Hungarian forces to capture the city, however, the Hungarians were indecisive and failed to take aggressive action. As a result, Jellachich's forces joined up with the forces of Windischgraetz and by 23 October had surrounded the city. On 31 October Vienna was bombarded into submission and martial law was imposed.³¹

The defeat of the revolutionaries in Vienna was followed by the formation of a new government under Prince Felix von Schwarzenberg who was determined to put an end to the revolution. Schwarzenberg persuaded the emperor Ferdinand to abdicate in December 1848 in favor of his nephew, Francis Joseph. Schwarzenberg, although a firm believer in the restoration of autocratic rule, established a new cabinet that included elements of both the upper middle class and liberals as he realized that some change was necessary to prevent further revolution.³²

As the conservative forces reasserted their hold over most of the Habsburg Empire, the government was now able to direct its energies to crushing the separatist movement in Hungary. Although Windischgraetz achieved initial victories, and occupied Budapest on 3 January 1849, the Hungarians were able to successfully counterattack and push the Austrians back to their own borders. The Austrians were determined to crush the Hungarians, however, and as a result the Austrians requested aid from Nicholas, the tsar of Russia in June 1849. Nicholas provided Austria with 140,000 troops, and on August 9 the Hungarian forces were decisively defeated at the battle of Temesvar. Kossuth realized that further resistance was useless and fled to Turkey on 12 August.³³

With the defeat of the Hungarians, Austria restored its internal security and it now turned its attention to halting the plan of Prussia's Frederick William to unite Germany under Prussian leadership. By 1850 it became clear that if Prussia continued with its plan for unification, war would develop between Austria and Prussia. Under pressure from both Austria and Russia, Prussia agreed to give up its plan and signed a convention at Olmuetz in November 1850 reestablishing the old Germanic Confederation. Although this returned the situation in Germany back to the status quo, Olmuetz was a diplomatic defeat for Prussia, and is referred to in Prussian history as the "humiliation of

Olmuetz." Thus at the end of 1850, resentments existed between Austria and Prussia over German unification, with important implications for the future.

E. SUMMARY

The revolutions of 1848 undermined the stability of the international system not only in the short period of revolutionary upheaval from 1848 to 1849, but also in the long run as the revolutions released forces that would dominate Europe for a generation. Although the events of 1848 bear little resemblance to the French Revolution, the forces that they released were remarkably similar.

Just as during the French Revolutionary period, 1848 produced a period of tremendous elite instability. Throughout Central Europe conservative and liberal elites were faced with both internal and in some cases external threats. Conservatives were unable to deal with the economic, social and political discontent that precipitated the revolutions, and therefore it is not at all surprising that they were swept away by the advocates of liberal and social reform. The liberals, however, were unable to effectively handle the political mobilization that resulted from the revolutions and produced competing demands which led to divisions within the liberal movement. These problems were compounded by the liberal failure to achieve control over the largely conservative armies and with the

result that the revolutionaries lay under the constant threat of counter-revolution.

The conservative reaction that followed the revolutions did not fully restore elite stability. Although all the conservative regimes implemented new means of repression and the strength of the state increased dramatically, conservatives now realized that they could no longer ignore the liberal demands of the masses unless they were willing to tolerate the constant threat of revolution. The threatened emergence of the politics of mass society placed the structure of conservative regimes in jeopardy. According to Richard Rosecrance it was "...this atmosphere of internal instability and uncertainty which gave rise to the age of Realpolitik."³⁴

1848 also resulted in a resurgence of nationalism throughout Europe, although now it became an instrument of the conservative reactionaries rather than the liberal revolutionaries. This reactionary exploitation was possible mainly because nationalism appealed to elements of all classes while liberalism was essentially a middle class movement.³⁵ Thus the conservatives had an effective tool that could provide broad based support for their cause. The force of nationalism in conservative hands, just as in the hands of liberal revolutionaries, proved to be a destructive force as nationalism eventually destroyed the ability of the eastern powers to cooperate among themselves. Prussia and

Austria would soon find themselves in a struggle over the control of Germany, thereby undermining the once solid conservative eastern block. The use of nationalism by the conservatives also undermined the legitimacy of conservative elites, which was based upon dynastic principles, with important repercussions for both the stability of the conservative ruling elites and their ability to cooperate among themselves.

A decline in the international perspective of the ruling elites also emerged after the revolutions of 1848. The challenge presented by liberalism and the politics of mass society resulted in the conservative elites focusing on internal reforms and the strengthening of the machinery of the state.³⁶ Conservative regimes were now more concerned with defending themselves rather than defending conservatism throughout Europe. Austria, Prussia and Russia (and England and France as well) no longer worked effectively together to secure acceptable outcomes as each of the powers sought to preserve its own institutions even at the expense of its previous allies.³⁷

The year 1848 also marked a return to conflicts at the center of the European continent, again not only during the brief period of revolutionary upheaval, but for the long term as well. Unlike the end of the Napoleonic Era when the Congress of Vienna resolved the major territorial disputes and established a balance of power, no such congress

occurred after the revolutions of 1848. As a result, antagonisms remained among the powers over territories in Germany, Austria and Italy - areas of great sensitivity and where vital interests were involved. These unresolved territorial issues, coupled with the inward focus of the major powers and a resurgence of nationalism resulted in a situation where the opportunities for frictions were many, and eventually resulted in a series of continental conflicts including the Italian war in 1859, the war between Denmark and Germany in 1864, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.

Although it may at first appear that the victory of the conservative reactionaries after the revolutions of 1848 should have resulted in what Fouthas claimed was "the end of the world" and that "subsequent events were the fruit of different ideas", this was not entirely true. Although after 1848, the ideological struggle between conservatism and liberalism was not as strongly pursued at the international level, ideology became a more powerful tool domestically. Ruling elites sought to increase their legitimacy and ensure political demobilization through the "...increasing use of formal political ideology whose basic concepts and slogans were spread to even the remotest communities by middle class intermediaries."³⁸ Thus nations such as France, Prussia and Austria increasingly used ideology as a means to ensure their survival. In this

sense ideology was very important because when combined with nationalism the two increased the power of the state dramatically.

The increased power of the state, when combined with the industrial modernization of the period, allowed states to obtain increasingly more capable armed forces. The period of relatively limited ends and means that existed from 1815 to 1848 was rapidly coming to a close, and in its place would emerge what A. J. P. Taylor called "the struggle for mastery in Europe" where not only the fate of the great powers but that of the entire continent was to be decided.

Finally, 1848 marked the breakdown of the international system. The principles that guided the diplomacy of 1815 to 1848 were no longer able to prevent conflict from emerging. The relative solidarity of the eastern powers was shattered by the struggle between Prussia and Austria over German unity. A system designed to prevent liberalism from creating revolutionary upheavals was no longer applicable in dealing with a system where nationalism was now a driving factor. A new system was necessary, but the statesmen of the great powers were unable to transcend the limits of the pre-existing diplomacy. It was not until Bismarck established a system based on a series of alliances that an operating international system would be restored. Thus, while the revolutions of 1848 were brief in nature, they unleashed forces that created instability in the international system for a generation.

¹Charles Pouthas, "The Revolutions of 1848," The Zenith of European Power 1830-70, ed. J. P. T. Bury, vol. 10 of The New Cambridge Modern History, gen ed. J. P. T. Bury (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 414.

²Matthew Smith Anderson, The Ascendancy of Europe 1815-1914, (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1972), 91.

³William L. Langer, The Revolutions of 1848, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1969), 10-14.

⁴Lawrence C. Jennings, France and Europe in 1848 A Study of French Foreign Affairs in Time of Crises, (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 2-3.

⁵C. A. Macartney, The Habsburg Empire 1790-1918, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969), 322.

⁶*Ibid.*, 324.

⁷A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle For Mastery in Europe 1848-1918, Oxford History of Modern Europe, eds. Alan Bullock and F. W. D. Deakin, (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 5.

⁸*Ibid.*, 6.

⁹Anderson, The Ascendancy of Europe 1815-1914, 97.

¹⁰Macartney, The Habsburg Empire 1790-1918, 328.

¹¹Paul Ginsborg, Daniele Manin and the Venetian Revolution of 1848-49, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 56.

¹²Roger Price, The Revolutions of 1848, Studies in European History, ed. Richard Overy, (London: Macmillan Education, 1988), 39.

¹³Peter N. Stearns, 1848: The Revolutionary Tide in Europe, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1974), 146.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 147-8.

¹⁵Taylor, The Struggle For Mastery in Europe 1848-1918, 8.

¹⁶Karl Marx, Class Struggles in France 1848-1850, (New York: International Publishers, 1980), 47-49.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 49.

¹⁸Stearns, 1848: The Revolutionary Tide in Europe, 88-93.

¹⁹J. A. S. Grenville, Europe Reshaped 1848-1878, History of Europe, vol. 4 ed. J. H. Plumb, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), 76.

²⁰Price, The Revolutions of 1848, 92.

²¹James Joll, "Prussia and the German Problem, 1830-66," The Zenith of European Power 1830-70, ed. J. P. T. Bury, vol. 10 of The New Cambridge Modern History, gen ed. J. P. T. Bury (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 499.

²²*Ibid.*, 500.

²³Stearns, 1848: The Revolutionary Tide in Europe, 191-3.

²⁴Langer, The Revolutions of 1848, 187-8.

²⁵Macartney, The Habsburg Empire 1790-1918, 359-60.

²⁶Llewellyn Woodward, Prelude to Modern Europe 1815-1914, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1972), 227.

²⁷Gordon A. Craig, Europe Since 1815, alt. ed., (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), 94.

²⁸R. John Rath, The Viennese Revolution of 1848, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1957), 256.

²⁹A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918 A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948), 74.

³⁰Langer, The Revolutions of 1848, 156.

³¹*Ibid.*, 157-8.

³²Stearns, 1848: The Revolutionary Tide in Europe, 195.

³³Rath, The Viennese Revolution of 1848, 430.

³⁴Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics International Systems in Perspective, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), 282.

³⁵Robert C. Binkley, Realism and Nationalism 1852-1871, vol. 15 of The Rise of Modern Europe, ed. William L. Langer (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1935), 69-70.

³⁶Price, The Revolutions of 1848, 95.

³⁷Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics International Systems in Perspective, 247.

³⁸Price, The Revolutions of 1848, 97.

VI. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AFTER THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1989

The French Revolution and the revolutions of 1848 both resulted in the development of several critical factors that had a destabilizing affect on the international system. These factors included nationalism, a decline in internationalist perspective, widely divergent ideological views, policies that had unlimited ends and pursued with vastly expanded means, conflicts that erupted in the center of Europe rather than in peripheral colonial areas, instability within the ruling elites, and finally a breakdown in the operation of the international system brought on by key actors changing the rules of the game. Although these factors were present during both revolutionary periods, the differences in the level of intensity of these factors helps to explain the level of instability that developed in the international system. Before assessing the presence of these factors following the revolutions of 1989, it would be prudent to give a brief description of each of these variables.

A. FACTORS CREATING INSTABILITY AFTER REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE

Although nationalism can be both productive and counter-productive, during times of revolutionary change it has tremendous destabilizing potential for the international

system. The force of nationalism is particularly destabilizing when it is used as a means of expanding a nation's resource base and uniting a people to achieve a goal. This unifying potential was particularly evident following the French Revolution when a "nation in arms" almost established hegemony over Europe. Unlike 1789, nationalism in 1848 created instability through domestic turmoil, particularly in the multi-ethnic Habsburg empire. The domestic instability that developed in this central European empire created a large power vacuum, which would only eventually be filled by a resurgence of reactionary forces. It is these two possibilities - the one of a state rapidly mobilizing and expanding its resource base, and the other of creating domestic turmoil through the dismantling of an existing state, that makes nationalism a particularly dangerous force in the emerging international system.

During past revolutionary periods there has similarly been a marked decline in the internationalist outlook of the ruling elites. During both the eighteenth century and the Metternichean period (1815-1848), the monarchs of Europe strongly believed that it was natural and right that five great powers should exist on the European continent. This belief was demonstrated through the concept of the balance of power, which was designed to prevent one country from establishing hegemony on the European continent. This internationalist perspective was destroyed by Napoleon and

the French who were no longer concerned with maintaining the existing European order. By contrast, in 1848 and during the reactionary period that followed, the decline of an internationalist perspective was the result of domestic crises and turmoil. Both liberal and conservative ruling elites became more concerned with strengthening the position of their own rule, although conservative elites were still somewhat internationalist-oriented because they realized the dangers that revolutionary periods posed to stability in Europe. Still, the political cooperation that existed between the powers during the Metternichean period was substantially reduced as domestic turmoil and rising nationalism produced states that were much more inward looking. The decline of an internationalist perspective that developed as the result of the revolutions of 1848 may repeat itself today as many East European countries and the Soviet Union face a period of domestic turmoil and instability.

The French Revolution also produced an international system in which widely divergent ideological views developed between France and the rest of the European powers. The fundamental rights of man were directly opposed to the European dynastic order, and produced a European system similar to the one that existed during the wars of religion. The existence of widely divergent ideological views contributed greatly to the resulting violence of the

Napoleonic Wars. In 1848, although the potential for the emergence of widely divergent ideological views to develop existed, the course of events prevented ideology from becoming entrenched in the international system. This smothering of nationalist ideology was the result of the rapid change from conservative to liberal elites, and the subsequent reversal. The holding in check of nationalist ideology helps to explain why the aftermath of the revolutions of 1848 was considerably more peaceful than the aftermath of the French Revolution. After 1848, however, nationalist ideologies were directed inward as a means of achieving domestic legitimacy by the ruling elites and as a result the strength of the state as an institution increased dramatically. The increased strength of the state helped to undermine the period of relatively limited diplomatic ends and means of the Metternichean period.

The forces of nationalism and ideology helped to create a diplomatic period characterized by policies that had expanded ends pursued with vastly greater means. During the eighteenth century, despite the violence of the wars of the Spanish and Austrian Successions and the Seven Years' War, with the exception of Prussia's annexation of Silesia, the geographic composition of the great powers of Europe did not drastically change, nor did the great powers attempt to alter political boundaries radically. Although it is true that there were deep seated hostilities between France and

England and France and the Habsburg Empire, none of the countries possessed the means to destroy another. As the result of a widely divergent ideology and the appeal of nationalism during the French Revolutionary period, however, France ended up pursuing an unlimited policy of liberating the peoples of Europe from alleged monarchical tyranny. Unlike 1789, this phenomenon did not emerge in 1848 for two primary reasons. First, France refused to support the revolutionary movements throughout Europe for fears of a return to the Napoleonic Wars. Without the support of France, liberal elites found it extremely difficult to triumph, especially in Italy. Second, the conservative forces had learned well from the French Revolutionary period and realized the dangers of revolutionary upheaval and the mobilization of society. This perception of danger, after an initial loss of confidence by the conservatives, resulted in a more aggressive response than might otherwise have occurred.

The location of conflict during times of revolutionary change is also a source of instability for the international system. During both the French and 1848 revolutionary periods, conflict erupted in the center of both Europe and the international system. Such conflict was particularly destabilizing because of the wide range of powers affected and the complexities entailed. Although colonial disputes were often dangerous and violent, the risks of horizontal escalation from instability on the periphery was

substantially lower than the risks of horizontal escalation from instabilities in the center of the European continent where the great powers had more to lose.

The instability that develops amongst the ruling elites during times of revolutionary upheaval also tends to destabilize the international system. Both the French revolutionaries and the monarchs of Europe soon viewed each other as mortal enemies that had to be eliminated, and therefore the likelihood of stability in Europe was greatly decreased. Similarly, in 1848 both conservatives and liberals viewed one another as threats to their rule with resulting foreign intervention in domestic affairs. The threat of foreign intervention to eliminate real or perceived threats to the ruling elites placed the international system in a state of flux and resulted in significantly reducing the possibility of stability in Europe. Additionally, the domestic turmoil that preceded the revolutions and existed during them resulted in the possibility that ruling elites would be overthrown by angry mobs, a factor that added to this instability.

Finally, although the end result of all the above factors, the breakdown of the operation of the international system prevented the restoration of its stability. France's hegemonic drive on the European continent, when coupled with its rapidly expanding resources base, prevented the eighteenth century balance of power system and associated

diplomatic and military maneuvering from checking French expansion. After 1848, although the great powers still attempted to meet periodically to address the problems of Europe, as a result of the revolutions and a decline in internationalist perspective, the effective functioning of the European concert was drastically reduced. It was not until Bismarck created his series of alliances that a functioning "international system" would be restored. The lack of an operational international system has generally produced an unstable environment even in non-revolutionary times as evidenced by the instabilities that emerged as the result of the collapse of the League of Nations during the interwar period and the ineffectiveness of the United Nations in the early years following World War Two.

B. INSTABILITY IN THE POST 1989 INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Numerous scholars suggest today that Europe, and the world in general, are heading toward peace and stability. The post 1989 international system, however, is showing signs of the emergence of the elements of instability that have characterized previous revolutionary periods. Although the Hobbesian pessimism of many scholars who predict total chaos and anarchy may be unfounded, in terms of the variables previously identified it appears that the opportunities for frictions to develop in the international system are greater

than during the Cold War. This pessimism is at least partially offset, however, by the possibility that the strength of the destabilizing variables that have emerged today are not as strong as those that have emerged from past revolutionary periods.

1. Gauging the Strength of Re-emerging Nationalism

One of the immediate consequences of the revolutions of 1989 has been the release of long repressed nationalist passions inside the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, particularly in multi-ethnic Yugoslavia in the latter case. Similarly, the unification of East and West Germany has raised new fears of a resurgent Germany using the principles of the right to self-determination to regain territories lost at the end of World War Two. Concerns have been additionally raised that a united Germany will attempt to establish economic hegemony on the European continent, establishing a satellite system in Eastern Europe. Although in the short run, nationalist conflicts are bound to erupt in Eastern Europe, particularly in the Balkans and the Soviet Union, the likelihood of nationalism resulting in a large scale war is less likely today than in 1789, 1914 or 1939.

On the more optimistic side, Stephen Van Evera notes that two primary developments in postwar Europe have resulted in a dramatic decline in nationalist propaganda,

particularly in the West.¹ The first has been the decline of nationalist passions as the result of concerted efforts by international agencies and educational institutions to present more balanced historical perspectives. Before World War Two, nations often depicted their hostile neighbors as harsh, cruel and backward while portraying its own people as kind, civilized and progressive. The result of this post war effort was to create a single, shared version of European history and reduce the possibility of hyper-nationalism in the West.

The second optimistic factor contributing to the weakening of nationalism has been the partial social leveling of European societies, particularly by the communists even though they too produced their own elites. The popular discontent that emerged between the classes in the European social order has declined dramatically since World War Two, and with it the ability of European elites to appeal to social groupings with nationalistic principles to bolster their domestic position.

Although there is some truth to Van Evera's reasoning and his conclusion that hyper-nationalism has been largely eliminated in the West, the emerging nationalism in the East may not be so easily overcome. The nationalistic grievances between the East European peoples are the result of deep seated historical disputes over national borders few of which were resolved at Yalta or Potsdam. Additionally,

the decline of nationalist passions in the West was paralleled by the increasing integration among the West European countries making the re-emergence of nationalistic passions less likely. In the East, the decline of nationalist passions was the result of Soviet suppression. With the removal of Soviet dominance, these long repressed nationalist feelings have already reappeared. As a result, nationalism in the East will still be a driving force, particularly in Southeastern Europe. Although optimists feel that the strength and stability of the West will help to stabilize the East, the likely disintegration of Yugoslavia and the possible disintegration of the Soviet Union will serve to inflame nationalist passions, offsetting the influence of the West.

Although the optimistic outlook about the decline of nationalistic confrontation in Eastern Europe may be unfounded, the optimistic belief that the unification of East and West Germany will not result in the renewal of German expansion appears more realistic. Besides the moderating effect that a more balanced historical perspective has had on Germany, the legacy of the first half of the twentieth century has profoundly influenced the political development of Germany. According to Thomas Kielinger, the editor of Rheinischer Merkur, "With so much of Germany's national fiber destroyed and morally degraded, it was difficult to conceive of even a relaxed form of

patriotism, the mildest form of national pride, ever emerging as a force to be reckoned with. Given to erudition and cerebral reflexes, Germans had well absorbed the lesson of their appalling record during this century and had, as a result, turned to peaceful ways of applying their talent and irresistible urge to excel."²

The German society of today is now firmly entrenched in the Western liberal democratic tradition, and with the exception of developing a leadership role in world economic matters, Germany has consistently maintained a low profile in world politics. Although there are those who are fearful of Germany again seizing the initiative, these fears are based on the experiences of Germany in the first half of this century when Germany's historical condition was remarkably different. The circumstances that contributed to the two world wars, and Germany's position within those circumstances, are drastically different today. Thus a resurgence of German nationalism like that which existed from 1890 to 1945 is unlikely. As previously noted, however, the historical circumstances surrounding the nationalist conflicts in Eastern Europe have not been altered, merely repressed, and therefore the outlook for nationalism in Eastern Europe is much more pessimistic.

2. Gauging the Strength of Internationalist Outlook

One of the biggest questions that remains to be answered following the revolutions of 1989 is whether or not

the countries of Eastern Europe, and the world in general, will develop a more internationalist outlook. In the short term it appears that Eastern Europe will attempt to seek greater integration with the West, particularly in the economic sphere. This tendency has produced great optimism from the proponents of economic liberalism, who believe that enhanced economic interdependence will produce greater stability in three primary ways.

First, economic liberals believe that states will become more prosperous and that this prosperity will serve to bolster peace. Second, economic interdependence will compel states to cooperate with one another on economic matters. Third, economic cooperation will lead to political cooperation and a significant strengthening of the internationalist perspective. The barriers established by the Cold War to this liberal economic order have now been removed, and as a result the liberals believe that a more internationalist outlook will emerge.³

This optimistic assessment must be tempered, however, by the past political realities of the Eastern European situation. With the forced social, cultural and economic separation from the West by the Soviet Union now over, the Eastern European countries will seek to reclaim their individual European identity. Although the transition to adopting democratic institutions, private property, and a

market type economy may be swift, the rise in living standards to ones comparable to those in the West will not be achieved in the short term. Although there may be pockets of rapid economic growth and prosperity, the emerging economic relations between East and West may more closely resemble that of North and South.⁴

The optimism of the liberal economic perspective is further reduced when one considers the role that security issues have had in suppressing economic disputes between the Western economic powers during the Cold War. In the past, significant economic disputes arising between the United States and its major allies were either repressed or overcome by the hegemonic powers imposing a solution rather than solving a problem through mutual agreement. This situation was possible only because of the overriding concern for security among the allies. With security concerns substantially diminished, and the development of new systems of equal partners, the resolution of conflicts that arise over economic policies will become more difficult, because "...partners can only disagree."⁵

Although interdependence can create mutual vulnerabilities, these vulnerabilities will vary between states. The less vulnerable states will have greater bargaining power over the more dependent states, and may therefore seek to obtain substantial concessions and benefits. The disputes that arise from this situation will

in all likelihood not be resolved easily.⁶ The economic competition that is likely to replace the security and military competition of the Cold War also is not likely to produce states that are deeply concerned with the international system, but rather with promoting economic gain for their countries. The economic pie is still expanding, but there are now more hungry mouths to feed at the table. And finally, besides the economic problems that may contribute to a decline in internationalist perspective, the internal turmoil that has developed within the Soviet Union and is likely to develop in the Eastern European states as reforms take place, will redirect a substantial portion of those states' energies inward.

Although the foregoing paints a dim picture for the possibility of an internationalist outlook emerging, pessimism is offset to a degree by the large number of international organizations (mainly through the United Nations) that are already established. Unlike the past revolutionary periods previously discussed, political leaders will not have to face the problem of establishing institutions to facilitate international cooperation. Organizations such as NATO, CSCE, and the EC could also be altered to accommodate the emerging Eastern European democracies, although this would require the western leaders to transcend the previous limits of diplomacy. These organizations could help contribute to developing an internationalist outlook amongst the East Europeans.

3. The Decline of Ideological Confrontation

Perhaps the single strongest factor that will contribute to a more peaceful and stable world is the decline of ideological confrontation between nations that existed during the Cold War. In the revolutionary periods of 1789 and 1848, strong ideological divergence among the great powers was closely paralleled by high levels of violence.

Stephen Van Evera argues that the expansion of liberal democracy to Eastern Europe will promote a peaceful world for two reasons.⁷ First, the ideologies of democracies do not incorporate a claim to rule other democracies, hence they have no ideological motives for expansion against one another. Second, democratic elites would have more difficulty legitimizing a war against another democracy. Although the empirical evidence suggests that relations among democracies are more peaceful than relations among non-democratic states, this evidence is tempered by the fact that the Western democracies have a shared cultural and historical experience. This commonality of outlook contributes to peace among these states. The countries of Eastern Europe, in contrast, had more culturally and historically diverse backgrounds, prior to the presently disintegrating period of communist rule. Even if liberal democratic movements succeed in Eastern Europe,

the likelihood that relations between them will be as peaceful as those of the West is questionable.

Although many of the East European countries are moving in a democratic direction, making democracy work in these countries for the first time will be a long and difficult process. The establishment of political legitimacy will be closely linked to economic success, and because the transition to a market economy faces the challenges of inflation, unemployment, shortages, strikes and recession, the survival of new democratic institutions and politicians will constantly be in peril. It is quite possible that out of the rubble of the Eastern European states, the political systems that emerge may more closely resemble Fascist systems rather than liberal democratic ones. It is not impossible that dictatorships could rise through popular elections and mandates, similar to the rise of Louis Napoleon in France following the revolution of 1848.

Despite the fact that the democratic institutions of Eastern Europe are facing an uphill struggle to achieve stability and ensure success, there is hope for the future. Unlike the Cold War, where the West could only exert limited pressures on the Warsaw Pact countries for political reform, the fall of communism and the severance of Eastern Europe's ties with the Soviet Union have placed these countries in a position where large scale, rapid economic aid is required

to rebuild these countries. Even though the West could not supply all the capital required for recovery, any aid provided could be linked to the adoption of liberal democratic and economic reforms. This linkage could be used to ensure the strengthening of democratic institutions emerging in Eastern Europe and to help prevent the emergence of widely divergent ideological views.

4. Prospects for the Return of Nationalist Mobilization

The resurgence of nationalist aspirations in Eastern Europe has brought with it fears that this force will be used to mobilize society to redress the long repressed grievances that have existed between the peoples of Eastern Europe. This mobilization could result in a situation like that of the French Revolution, where unlimited ends were pursued with vastly expanded means. Although this scenario is unlikely to develop on a continental scale as in 1789, this possibility should not be overlooked on a regional basis, especially in the Balkans and in the Soviet Union.

During the Cold War, nationalist mobilization was largely repressed through alliance structures which promoted the use of professional armies relying on complex high technology military equipment and nuclear weapons. With the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, the Eastern European countries may exploit nationalist appeals to mobilize its citizenry to maintain large standing armies and militias to

settle various ethnic conflicts. This process is already underway in Yugoslavia as the republics of Serbia and Croatia have mobilized and made war along nationalist lines.

Although the current situation in Yugoslavia leads one to be concerned about nationalistic mobilization, this appears to be a regional phenomenon. The countries of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have already implemented steps to decrease the size of their armed forces by 25 to 33 percent.⁸ In the Balkans, however, besides Yugoslavia, the countries of Romania and Bulgaria have maintained their armed forces at old Warsaw Pact levels.

Additionally, although the European states may propagate nationalism to persuade their citizens to support expanded defense expenditures, this pattern can be effectively dampened by the West. The United States can dampen security motives by maintaining a military presence in Europe. A concerted effort by the Western European powers to assist countries that are faced with armed aggression, thereby rendering any mobilization useless as well as prohibitively costly for the aggressor, would also serve to dampen this type of nationalism.

5. A Return to Continental Conflict

Past revolutionary upheavals in Europe have been particularly destabilizing because they occurred at the center of the international system. Although it is true

that the colonial and imperialist conflicts of the 18th and 19th centuries reverberated back to the European continent and contributed to increased tensions, the event that always embroiled the continent in war was an inter-European conflict. The reason for this was mostly the close proximity of the powers to one another and the fact that gains made by one power at the expense of another in Europe were perceived to fundamentally alter the balance of power. This feeling was particularly strong among the English, who went through great efforts to secure peace on the continent in order to more effectively wage wars on the seas and in distant colonial lands.

During the Cold War, both the Western and Eastern allies sought to prevent conflict from erupting in the center of Europe, realizing that any confrontation there would be disastrous. Although vigorous propaganda and covert operations were mounted to destabilize the opposing states, there was a tacit understanding regarding the limits of these efforts. The end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe, however, has undermined and enfeebled the international system that prevented conflicts from erupting in Europe. It is now likely that Europe may once again become the center of armed confrontation especially in the Balkans.

Besides the internal ethnic conflicts like those that have produced the civil war in Yugoslavia and a

situation at the time of this writing where it appears that only outside intervention will prevent a brutal repression of the Croation secessionist movement, there are many external disputes among the states. The conflicts between nations are particularly dangerous because the majority of these disputes are territorial disputes arising from ethnic claims. Although the concept of human rights as it refers to the problem of national minorities is becoming increasingly accepted, the right to choose one's cultural and geographical area is not, nor will be in the near future, a universally accepted right.⁹ This situation will lead to increasing tensions between the Eastern European countries, where a host of conflicts exist, particularly in the Balkans.

A dangerous present (1991) threat to stability in Europe in general, is posed by the continuing disintegration of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia borders on seven states and is the heart of the Balkans. Additionally, because Yugoslavia is involved in a number of border and ethnic disputes with its Balkan neighbors, instability in Yugoslavia could easily spill over into other Balkan states.

The continuing disintegration of Yugoslavia is likely to increase tensions between Albania and Yugoslavia. Ethnic Albanians comprise 90 percent of Kosovo, an autonomous province of Serbia. This large Albanian population in Yugoslavia was the result of the London

Conference of 1913 which created the independent state of Albania, but only included half the Albanian population.¹⁰ The Serbian attitude is highly antagonistic towards both the Albanians of Kosovo and the Albanian state, which Serbs view as conspiring with Kosovo's Albanian majority to absorb or annex the province.¹¹ The antagonism developing between these two countries over Kosovo will most likely increase under the strong nationalist propaganda being espoused by Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic.

Tensions similarly are increasing between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria over the Macedonian question. Bulgaria claims that the Slavic population of Macedonia, Yugoslavia's southernmost republic, is ethnically and historically Bulgarian, although Bulgaria denies any territorial ambitions. This ambiguous stance has raised concerns about Bulgaria's true intentions.¹² Conversely, Bulgaria has become concerned about an ethnic Macedonian nationalist organization known as Ilinden, which has raised fears in Bulgaria that a resurgent Macedonian nation would claim parts of Bulgaria. The emergence of Ilinden has resulted in many Bulgarians believing that the movement is Serbian sponsored.

The Macedonian issue is also raising concerns in Greece, a state which has vigorously denied the existence of a Macedonian nationality for fear that it may call into question Greece's northern border. The refusal of Greece to

recognize Macedonian nationality led to charges by Yugoslavia that Greece is not protecting the rights of the Macedonian minority in Greece. As a result, increased border crossing disputes arose throughout 1990 as Greece refused to allow individuals who were identified as Macedonians on their passports to enter Greece for fear that they may attempt to ferment anti-Greek sentiment. This practice led to 50,000 Macedonians blockading several border crossings between Yugoslavia and Greece in May of 1990.¹³

Besides Yugoslavia, the Balkan state of Romania is also embroiled in a series of disputes with neighboring states. Currently, Romania and Bulgaria are involved in a series of disputes over the pollution of the Bulgarian town of Ruse by Romanian industry in Guirgiu, an industrial center across the Danube. Additionally, there is no guarantee that the latent territorial dispute over the Romanian territory of Dobruđja, which contains a large Bulgarian minority will not re-emerge.

The Romanian-Hungarian dispute over the ethnic Hungarians in Romanian Transylvania is another source of conflict. The Treaty of Trianon in 1920 resulted in Hungary ceding Transylvania to Romania, resulting in approximately 2 million Hungarians living in Romania. Hungary asserts that these people are denied political and economic rights. This dispute intensified in March 1990 when attacks upon Hungarian minorities were provoked by the Romanian

ultra-nationalist group Romanian Hearth.¹⁴ This conflict is likely to deepen as the Hungarian Democratic Forum continues to make the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Romanian a major issue.

Romania also is involved in a dispute with the Soviet Union over Bessarabia, which was incorporated into the Soviet Moldavian Republic after World War Two. Although it is unlikely that the Iliescu government will promote a Romanian-Moldavian state, the ethnic clashes that resulted in the deployment of Interior Ministry (MVD) troops to the Moldavian Republic in October and November 1990, are likely to continue.¹⁵

The Balkan state of Bulgaria is also involved in a dispute with Turkey. Currently, approximately 10 percent of the Bulgarian population is comprised of ethnic Turks, despite large scale expulsions in 1950-51, 1968 and 1989. The Turks remaining in Bulgaria have subsequently been subjected to a national assimilation policy, although the Bulgarian government asserts that these people were ethnic Bulgarians who had been compelled to become Turkish during the Ottoman occupation, and now they are just being "re-Bulgarianized."¹⁶ Following the ouster of communist leader Zhivkov in November 1989, however, the decision was made to restore the rights and property of Turkish minorities, leading to the return of ethnic Turks to Bulgaria to reclaim their past occupations and property.

This has led to increased tensions between Bulgarians and Turks within Bulgaria, and any renewal of violence between the two groups will heighten tensions between the two countries.¹⁷

Although the Balkans are clearly the "powder keg of Europe", the potential for nationalist territorial disputes is also present in other areas, particularly between Poland and its Eastern and Western neighbors. Poland's frontiers were radically altered at the end of the Second World War when Poland lost large amounts of territory to the Soviet Union while being compensated with former German territories to the West. The 1989 Soviet census results show that over 1 million ethnic Poles are living in portions of Byelorussia, the Ukraine and Lithuania, and this has fueled Polish nationalist factions within Poland. Polish claims have been met by both the Soviet Republic's and Lithuania's own irredentist claims regarding their ethnic minorities in Poland.

The number of Germans living in Poland, with estimates ranging from 50,000 to 1 million,¹⁸ is also a hot political issue as this number appears to be increasing as many Poles seek association with Germany for economic reasons. Although it is extremely unlikely that the German-Polish border is going to become an issue after the signing of the German-Polish bilateral treaty in November 1990 recognizing the Oder-Neisse boundary, the eventual

growth of German influence in Western Poland can not be discounted.

Although the possibility of conflict in Eastern Europe is high, the likelihood of this conflict engulfing the entire continent is low. The instability of the East is offset by the unprecedented stability of the West. The challenge for the West is therefore to promote and expand this stability to Southeastern Europe. This is currently a difficult problem since the mechanisms that ensured stability on this portion of the continent during the Cold War have been dismantled and no new mechanisms have yet been put in their place.

6. Instability of the Ruling Elite

The political elites of Eastern Europe are likely to face many of the same challenges that the liberal elites faced in Europe following the revolutions of 1848. After 1848, widespread political mobilization created a situation where diverse groups were able to make demands and seek recognition of special interests. The developing political factionalization prevented political cooperation among the various liberal factions, and prevented a consensus from being reached regarding solutions to the economic and social crises that caused the revolution. This resulted in making the economic and social crises that caused the revolutions of 1848 substantially worse, and laid the foundation for the

eventual conservative reaction as it became generally accepted that the restoration of social order was vital for the restoration of prosperity.

The problem facing the liberal elites of 1989 is similar to that of 1848. With no experience handling a mobilized society, and no institutional means intact to effectively manage competing interests, will the Eastern European leaders be able to prevent a further decline in their countries economy and prevent a possible conservative reaction?

The domestic political problems facing the new Eastern European leaders is compounded by the problems of making a market economy function. Despite the difficulties involved in achieving an effectively functioning democracy, the transition to a market economy is likely to take much longer. Although states like Hungary and Czechoslovakia may have a reasonable chance at success based on their prewar history, the chances of success for many of the Balkan nations is substantially less. The probability of failure of economic reforms in the Balkans is likely to create further tensions in an area already unstable.

This pessimistic appraisal is offset, at least in the short term, by the fact that the Eastern European societies of today are not as sharply divided along class lines as the societies of 1848, although new class stratifications are already beginning to develop. The

competing interests that emerged in 1848 were the result of class conflicts as peasants, workers, the middle class and the nobility sought to improve their positions. The social leveling imposed by communist rule, however, significantly reduced the possibility of this type of conflict from emerging at the outset of the revolutions of 1989. Social stratification that is emerging today as a result of the economic collapse in Eastern Europe which has devastated many industries, and is a trend that is likely to continue. Social class frictions may therefore develop as a significant problem.

Some special interest political mobilization is also likely to occur. Both the communist party bureaucracies and the military organizations of Eastern Europe will attempt to hold on to their own privileges at the expense of democratic reforms. This is already becoming apparent in Romania, Bulgaria and within the Serbian republic of Yugoslavia. The way in which the Eastern European countries deal with the entrenched bureaucracies will have a significant affect on the future course of events in Eastern Europe.

7. The Breakdown of the International System

The end of the Cold War has resulted in the breakdown of the international system. The tacit spheres of influence and rules of the game have been eliminated, and no new rules have yet been established. As a result, conflicts

and disputes are left unregulated, risking the possibility of escalation. Currently there are several competing views regarding the establishment of a new international system, each with its own merits.

One of the most widely debated proposals is for European problems to be resolved through the institutionalization of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This proposal has the benefit of the Helsinki process of 1975 being closely linked with human rights, one of the fundamental sources of instability in Eastern Europe. The drawback of this plan is that it is unlikely that any agreement would ever be reached between many of the Eastern European countries, and therefore it is more likely to resemble the United Nations General Assembly where many issues are debated but few of critical importance are resolved.

Another popular proposal is to incorporate the new Eastern European democracies into the European Community (EC). The EC is a strong, well developed European institution with a good record of integrating less developed states into the European economic system and promoting political development. The European states are currently divided, however, over the admission of the Eastern European nations into the EC. France favors a policy of strengthening the institutions of the EC in Western Europe before allowing the access of Eastern European nations. The

French fear that the sudden rush of East European nations into the EC would undermine recent gains by creating greater factionalization as more special interests become involved. The Germans on the other hand favor a more rapid integration, largely because they stand to benefit the most as a result of their economic strength. The debate within the European Community over the pace of integration will not be resolved quickly, and therefore it is unlikely that an international system can be restored through the EC.

The revamping of NATO into a collective security organization is another proposal often cited as a means of restoring stability in Europe. By extending NATO membership to the East European countries and expanding NATO's security guarantee to include protection from attack by member states, NATO could provide a stabilizing influence on the European continent. The drawback to this proposal is twofold: first, many European countries (particularly in the West) are reluctant to enter into this type of agreement because of fears that they will become embroiled in the ethnic problems of the East. Second, this type of NATO expansion would have to include the Soviet Union to prevent fanning the fires of a conservative reaction. The inclusion of the Soviet Union, however, would not be warmly received by the East European nations who have spent the past 45 years attempting to break free of Soviet dominance.

Although there are many problems facing the reconstruction of the international system, these problems are not nearly as great as those that followed past revolutionary periods when the entire system had been destroyed. Currently there are several functioning institutions (NATO, CSCE, EC) that have the capability to restore international order in Europe, although they must be adapted to the changing environment. These changes are going to be difficult, although not impossible. There is reason for optimism for the future.

¹Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace, Europe After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), 23-25.

²Thomas Kielinger, "Waking up in the new Europe - with a headache," International Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 2 (1990), 250.

³John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future, Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), 45-46.

⁴Pierre Hassner, "Europe beyond partition and unity: disintegration or reconstitution?," International Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 3 (1990), 469-470.

⁵Robert W. Tucker, "1989 and all that," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 4 (Fall 1990), 106.

⁶John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," 46.

⁷Stepehn Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," 26-27.

⁸Daniel N. Nelson, "Europe's Unstable East," Foreign Policy, Vol. 82 (Spring 91), 147-148.

⁹Marcin Krol, "A Europe of nations or a universalistic Europe?," International Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 2 (1990), 287.

¹⁰F. Stephen Larrabee, "Long Memories and Short Fuses, Change and Instability in the Balkans," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), 72.

¹⁷Dennison Rusinow, "Yugoslavia: Balkan Breakup?," Foreign Policy, Vol. 83 (Summer 1991), 148-149.

¹²F. Stephen Larrabee, "Long Memories and Short Fuses," 75.

¹³Ibid., 76.

¹⁴Ibid., 83.

¹⁵Daniel N. Nelson, "Europe's Unstable East," 144.

¹⁶F. Stephen Larrabee, "Long Memories and Short Fuses," 78.

¹⁷Daniel N. Nelson, "Europe's Unstable East," 145.

¹⁸Ibid., 142.

VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The international system following the revolutionary periods of 1789 and 1848 examined in this thesis were characterized by instability. Although each revolution followed a different course of events and was the result of different conditions, the revolutions did appear to produce some common factors that created instability in the international system. Although more historical cases need to be examined to determine the validity of these factors, the following tentative uniformities appear to exist among the revolutions examined.

First, each post-revolutionary environment has resulted in an increase in nationalist passions. This has had a destabilizing effect on the international system either through rapidly expanding the resources available to the ruling elites or threatening the dismemberment of multi-ethnic empires and creating a large power vacuum in the international system.

Second, nations have tended to become more inwardly focused and have lost their internationalist perspective. This is normally due to the need to restore domestic stability, or in some cases, to the misperception that when a major power is undergoing domestic instability, it drops out of the international picture and therefore no longer

requires the attentions of the remaining powers. The loss of internationalist perspective creates international instability, because such a perspective is required to maintain the system.

A third tentative uniformity is that revolutionary events produce a heightened awareness of ideology, either internationally or domestically. This awareness is a common source of frictions at the international level when the ideologies of the powers are in opposition. Ideology can also create instability at the international level through its domestic application, either by creating internal instability due to its divisive effects on society, or by increasing the power of the state as in 1848 and thereby allowing the state to pursue more aggressive foreign policies.

Fourth, instability of the ruling elite emerges as the result of the combination of domestic instability and external threats during revolutionary situations and it is difficult to prevent this instability from spilling over into the international system.

Fifth, major revolutionary periods in Europe have resulted in conflict erupting in the center of the European continent. This has had tremendous destabilizing consequences because of the sensitivities involved as well as its effects on the balance of power.

A sixth tentative uniformity is a breakdown in the effective functioning of the international system. This is

the result of the combination of the revolutionary actors fundamentally altering the rules of the game while the non-revolutionary actors continue to conduct diplomacy along classis pre-revolutionary lines. Since the old rules no longer apply, however, conflicts are left unregulated by the international system.

Seventh, and finally, the combination of these factors produces a period where the relatively more limited ends and means of the previous diplomatic period are replaced by a period of vastly greater ends pursued with vastly expanded means as nations are willing to sacrifice the maintenance of the international system for nationalist goals.

If the tentative uniformities that emerged from the past revolutionary periods are developing today, the world is becoming more filled with friction than during the Cold War. Although the strength of these destabilizing forces has in some cases been reduced, it does appear that all these forces are present in the post 1989 international system.

First, nationalist passions are emerging in Eastern Europe and are a grave source of concern. The heightened nationalism of the Eastern European states is only partially offset by the enhanced stability of Western Europe, and therefore it appears that nationalism will again become a driving force in Europe, particularly in the east.

Second, although the decline of an internationalist perspective is countered by the unprecedented number of

international institutions that facilitate international cooperation and growing economic interdependence, these will only be effective if the statesmen of the non-revolutionary nations are able to break free from the constraints of their preexisting diplomacy to cooperate with the revolutionary nations.

Third, the ideological clash that normally emerges during revolutionary times is currently non-existent at the international level, but appears to exist at the domestic level in the revolutionary nations, adding to the instability of the ruling elite. The possibility of reactionary forces or the rise of fascist political systems in Eastern Europe cannot be ruled out, however, and therefore it is possible that an ideological clash could still emerge at the international level.

Fourth, the deteriorating economic conditions of the Eastern European countries are likely to increase the instability of the ruling elite. Elite instability will also be increased by the political mobilization that has resulted from the liberal and democratic reforms and place increased demands on political leaders that have little experience with democracy.

Fifth, concern exists because of the large number of territorial and ethnic conflicts that are unresolved on the European continent. Any unilateral attempts to redress these grievances will most likely result in conflict because of the sensitivities involved with territorial adjustments

on the European continent. It appears that the return of continental conflict may be more likely than in the recent past.

Sixth, a new international system to regulate the conflicts in Eastern Europe has not yet emerged, thus these countries are left with the legacy of Yalta and Potsdam. In the absence of a functioning system to regulate and resolve disputes, the Eastern European states may resort to unilateral action, with destabilizing consequences.

Seventh, and finally, the possibility of nationalist mobilization to pursue aggressive military policies can fortunately be offset by the advanced high technology weaponry of the United States and Western Europe, however, this is not likely to be helpful for the Balkans or the Soviet Union, and therefore the emerging diplomatic period in Eastern Europe is likely to be characterized by diplomacy that pursues vastly greater ends with vastly expanded means.

Although much work is required to restore stability to the international system, the reconstruction of the international system is perhaps the most important action which needs to be taken to restore order in Europe. Whether or not this occurs is dependent on the United States and Western Europe. Clearly the United States and Western Europe must assume a leadership role in pursuing a general post Cold War settlement in Europe. In the past, stability in the international system has only been restored when a concerted effort has been undertaken by the world's powers.

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